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D

efectiveness lies at the center of products liability law. Merely
making and selling a product that causes accidental harm to another
fails to provide a sufficient basis for moral or legal responsibility.'
Instead, the defendant is liable in products liability law only if the
defendant supplied a product that was deficient in some respect,
rendering the product "defective." In Roman law, responsibility for
product harm rested to a large extent on the notion of product defect, as it
2
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.© 2004 West Publishing. An earlier version of this article also appears in DAVID G.
OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 6.4 (2005).

.. Carolina Distinguished Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. Special

thanks to Natalie Byars, Aaron Dias, Alyson Campbell, Rochelle Oldfield, and Amy

Neuschafer for research and editorial assistance.
' See David G. Owen, The Moral Foundationsof Products Liability Law: Toward
First Principles,68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427, 461 (1993) (making and selling products

involved in product accidents is an insufficient basis for liability; moral philosophy
requires more than a causal connection between production and another's harm to hold a
producer accountable for harm) [hereinafter Owen, Moral Foundations].
2 For an overview of products liability history, see DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LAW § 1.2 (2005) [hereinafter OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW].

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 93

liability law around the world.3 Determining how defectiveness should be
defined 4 and proved 5 has preoccupied courts, commentators, and
products liability lawyers since the rise of modem products liability law
in America during the 1960s. Apart from special claims involving
misrepresentation,6 negligent entrustment,7 and certain others, s every
products liability claim requires proof that an unnecessary hazard in the
defendant's product caused the injury. Regardless of the underlying
cause of action, plaintiffs in products liability cases ordinarily must
establish that something was wrong with the product. Virtually every
product is dangerous in some manner and to some extent, at least when
put to certain uses. But most such dangers are simple facts of physics,
chemistry, or biology. There is no reasonable way to avoid them. For
such natural risks of life, product users, rather than product suppliers,
properly bear responsibility for avoiding and insuring against any
injuries that may result.9 But some products carry excessive risks that
users and consumers should not fairly be required to shoulder, either because the
risks are unexpected, or because they feasibly can be avoided by
manufacturers or other product suppliers. And so the law properly
requires that a product contain some excessive level of danger before
shifting the loss to the seller. The label that the law attaches to products
carrying such excessive risks is "defective." 10
At least implicitly, each of the three major causes of action in
products liability law requires that the product be defective. First,
negligence claims are predicated on the defectiveness of a product,
because its supplier ordinarily cannot be faulted for selling a product that

3For an overview of modem products liability law in other nations, see id. § 1.3.
4See id. § 4.3 (implied warranty), §§ 5.5-5.9 (strict liability in tort), & §§ 7.2, 8.28.7, & 9.2.
5

See id. §§ 6.3-6.4.

6See id. ch. 3.
7See id. § 15.1.
8 Other claims include those based on the implied warranty of fitness for particular
purpose (under U.C.C. § 2-315), or possibly the violation of a product safety statute,
such as a prohibition on the sale of fireworks to children or unlicensed persons (a species
of unlawful entrustment). Yet many products liability statutes, such as pure food acts, are
designed to prevent the sale of defective products. See id. §§ 1.1 & 7.5.
9See Owen, Moral Foundations,supra note 1,at 461.
Io See, e.g., Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 182 (Mich. 1984) ("[T]he
plaintiff must, in every case, in every jurisdiction, show that the product was defective.");
Phillips. v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Or. 1974) ("To impose liability

there has to be something about the article which makes it dangerously defective.");
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUcTs LiABfLrr' § 1 (2004) (discussing liability for
harm from commercial sale of defective product).
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is not defective." Second, a breach of the implied warranty of12
merchantability occurs when a product is "unfit" for ordinary use,
meaning virtually the same thing as "defective."' 3 Finally, strict liability
in tort is based explicitly on the sale of a defective product.1 4 The
centrality of the concept of defectiveness to products liability law is
reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Torts and Restatement (Third) of

Torts, both of which ground liability on the notion of product defect.' 5 In

short, product defectiveness is the heart of products liability law.

In most products liability cases, the plaintiffs basic claim is that a
defective condition in the defendant's product proximately caused the
plaintiffs harm. The plaintiff has the burden of proving each element of
such a case, including the product's defectiveness.'

6

Sometimes the

precise reasons for harm caused by a product will be a mystery, but the
circumstances may logically suggest that the product was defective and
perhaps that the manufacturer was negligent in selling it in that

condition. In such cases, the doctrines of product malfunction' 7 and res

ipsa loquitur 18 may help the plaintiff establish the product's
defectiveness and the liability of the manufacturer. In other cases, a
plaintiff may introduce evidence that the product violated an industry or

11See, e.g., Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 124 (Cal. 2001) (stating that under
both negligence and strict liability, plaintiff must prove a defect caused the injury and,
under negligence, "plaintiff must also prove 'an additional element, namely, that the
defect in the product was due to negligence of the defendant"' (citing William Prosser,
Strict Liability to the Consumer, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 50-51 (1966))); Oanes v. Westgo,
Inc., 476 N.W.2d 248, 253 (N.D. 1991) ("In negligent design claims it is well established
that a manufacturer or seller is not liable in the absence of proof that a product is
defective.... Thus, an element of a negligent design case is that the product is defective
or unsafe."). The ProductsLiability Restatement makes this point: "Negligence rests on a
showing of fault leading to product defect. Strict liability rests merely on a showing of
product defect." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. n.; see
also OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 2, §§ 2.1 & 5.9.
12 See U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (2004) (stating goods must be "fit for ordinary
purpose").
13See, e.g., Spectron Dev. Lab. v. Am. Hollow Boring Co., 936 P.2d 852 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1997) (manufacturing defect); see also OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra
note 2, §§ 4.3 & 5.9.
14See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1997) (strict liability for sale of
product in "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" to user or consumer); OWEN,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 2, at ch. 5).
15 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A; PRODUCTS LIABILITY
RESTATEMENT §§ 1 & 2.
16See PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT § 2 cmts. c (manufacturing defects), d & f
(design defects), & i (instruction and warning defects).
17See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 2, § 7.4.
'8See id. § 2.4.
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government safety standard to establish the product's defectiveness 9and
possibly the manufacturer's negligence as well. 20 On the other hand, the
defendant may rely on its compliance with such standards as evidence of
the product's non-defectiveness. Sometimes a plaintiff may rely in part
upon similar accidents involving the defendant's other similar products.
Likewise, a defendant may demonstrate that the absence of similar
accidents-that is, the product's record of safe performance-proves the
reverse. 22 Finally, a plaintiff may try to prove a product's defectiveness
or the defendant's negligence by showing that the defendant
acknowledged the problem by remedying the hazard after the plaintiffs
injury.23 This article addresses these recurring issues of proof.24
I.

SAFETY STANDARDS

Proof that a product violates or conforms to certain safety standards
pertaining to the hazard that caused the plaintiff's harm may be probative
of whether the product was defective. Such standards may be adopted by
the industry, perhaps through standard-setting organizations such as the
American National Standards Institute (ANSI), the National Safety
Council-(NSC), or the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE). Safety
standards may also be promulgated by the government through a statute,
or through the regulatory standards of a governmental agency, like the
Federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). In general, evidence that a
products liability defendant violated or complied with an applicable
safety standard is admissible on the issue of defectiveness.
The role of such evidence in proving or disproving defectiveness derives
from and parallels the law governing its use in proving and disproving
negligence, a topic examined elsewhere.25

19See discussion infra Part I.
20 The effect on a negligence claim of proof that a defendant violated a safety
standard, often referred to as the doctrine of negligence per se, is addressed in OWEN,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note

2, § 2.3.

21 Defendant may also demonstrate its compliance with such standards to help
disprove its negligence. See id; see also discussion infra Part I.A., I1.B.
22 See discussion infra Part II.C.
23 See discussion infra Part 11.
24 Special issues in proving negligence are examined in OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LAW, supra note 2, ch 2; see also David G. Owen, Proof of Negligence in Modern Products

Liability Litigation, 36 ARIz. ST.L. REv. (forthcoming Spring 2005).
25 See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 2, § 2.4.
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A. Industry Standards-Custom

A common type of evidence introduced during a defect dispute is an
industry's prevailing safety standard with respect to the particular product
characteristic at issue.26 For example, in an effort to prove a product's

defectiveness, a plaintiff may seek to demonstrate that other
manufacturers in the industry regularly use a safer design or a warning
that the defendant failed to adopt. Conversely, in an effort to show that
its product is not defective, a defendant manufacturer may seek to
introduce evidence that other manufacturers customarily use the same
design or warnings as the defendant on similar products. The
admissibility of customary industry standards derives from the use of this
type of evidence for nearly two centuries in negligence law-a good place to

start unraveling27the custom-as-evidence conundrum in the context of strict
liability in tort.
Industry safety standards for products often develop informally over
time, as a matter of custom, as engineers and other technical experts around the

nation (and the world) migrate between companies and exchange ideas in
papers, at conferences, and otherwise. Many industry safety provisions
are spawned more formally by organizations that specialize in
developing practicable standards of efficacy and safety, such as the
American National Standards Institute (ANSI), 28 the American Society
for Testing and Materials (ASTM), 9 the American Standards Association

26

See generally PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT § 2 cmt. d. (2004). On the very

similar rules applied in most jurisdictions to strict liability in tort, see 3 AM. LAW. PROD.
LIAB. § 30:47 (3d ed. 1996); 3 LOUIS R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 18.04[1] [hereinafter FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY]; OWEN,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 2, § 6.4; DAVID G. OWEN, M. STUART MADDEN, &
MARY J. DAVIS, MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 27:6 (3d ed. 2000)
[hereinafter MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY]; James Boyd & Daniel E.
Ingberman, Should "Relative Safety" Be a Test of Products Liability?, 26 J. LEGAL STUD.
433 (1997); Steven Hetcher, Creating Safe Social Norms in a Dangerous World, 73 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1 (1999); David A. Urban, Comment, Custom's Proper Role in Strict
Product Liability Actions Based on Design Defect, 38 UCLA L. REV. 439 (1990).
27 See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 2, § 2.4.
21 See, e.g., DiCarlo v. Keller Ladders, Inc., 211 F.3d 465, 468 (8th Cir. 2000)
(interpreting Missouri law with regard to stepladder standards); Clarke v. LR Sys., 219 F.
Supp. 2d 323, 334 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (guarding standard for grinders); Potter v. Chicago
Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1326 (Conn. 1997) (vibration limits for tools).
29 See, e.g., Emody v. Medtronic, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1294 (N.D. Ala. 2003)
(standards for chemistry, hardness, and microstructure for rod in spinal fusion device);
Ford v. Nairn, 717 N.E.2d 525, 530 (I11. App. Ct. 1999) (trampoline warnings).
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(ASA), 30

the

National

Laboratories (UL),

32

Safety

Council

(NSC), 31

Underwriters

and the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE).33

There are also a host of more arcane and specialized organizations,
including the American Society of Agricultural Engineers, 34 the National
Spa and Pool Institute,35 the Scaffolding and Shoring Institute,36 the
Industrial Stapling and Nailing Technical Association, 37 and the
American Conference of Governmental and Industrial Hygienists. 38
Although sometimes referred to as "quasi-public," these are actually

private organizations, many of which derive from and are essentially
controlled by the industries they serve. Thus, while some of these

organizations are actually quite independent,39 other organizations
produce standards that are little more than formal versions of standards

already established by the industry. As a result, though an industry may
40
most standards.
courts treat
safety standards,
rely
on these
4 them the same as less
'
types of industry
recognized
formally

30 See, e.g., Poches v. J.J. Newberry Co., 549 F.2d 1166, 1167 (8th Cir. 1977) (S.D.

law) (specifications for speed and angle of power mower blade).
31See, e.g., Hutchison v. Urschel Labs., Inc., 157 F.3d 613, 615 (8th Cir. 1998) (Mo.
law) (guarding standards for chicken dicer); Brown v. Clark Equip. Co., 618 P.2d 267,
275-76 (Haw. 1980) (concerning allowable blind spot on front-end loader).
32 See, e.g., Brodsky v. Mile High Equip. Co., 69 Fed. App. 53, 55 (3d Cir. 2003)
(Pa. law); Moulton v. Rival Co., 116 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1997) (Me. law).
33See, e.g., Alfred v. Caterpillar, Inc., 262 F.3d 1083 (10th Cir. 2001) (Okla. law)
(design of asphalt paver's speed control as lever rather than as rotary dial).
4 See Masters v. Hesston Corp., 291 F.3d 985, 991 (7th Cir. 2002) (I11. law)
(American Society of Agricultumal Engineers standards relevant to setting standard of design safety
for hay baler).
3 See Ryan v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 579 A.2d 1241, 1243-44 (N.J. 1990) (pool
depth standards).
36 See McNeal v. Hi-Lo Powered Scaffolding, Inc., 836 F.2d 637, 642-43 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (standards for scaffolding clips).
37See Baier v. Bostitch, 611 N.E.2d 1103, 1108 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (contact trip on
nailer should prevent tool from discharging under its own weight).
38 See Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319 (Conn. 1997)
(vibration limits for tools). These and other standards-setting organizations are described
in 6 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 26, §§ 76.01 & 76.03.
39 See, e.g., Fayerweather v. Menard, Inc., No. 01-2414, 2003 WL 238788, at *2
(Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2003) (ANSI's ladder committee membership comprised of onethird industry, one-third users, and one-third chosen from CPSC, OSHA, labor
organizations, and "outside specialists").
40 See Del Cid v. Beloit Corp., 901 F. Supp. 539, 545 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), aff'd, No.
96-7009, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 15842 (2d Cir. July 24, 1996) ("ANSI standards are
relied upon by the manufacturers of machinery and by experts in various fields to conduct
evaluations of the safety of machinery and processes.") (citation omitted).
41 However, because some standards-setting groups are comprised of members
outside the industry, and because their standards are voluntary guidelines of minimum
safety, they are not to be equated with "industry custom." See Fayerweather,2003 WL
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A great majority of courts allow use of relevant evidence of industry

custom.42 To be relevant, normally a standard must have existed at the time the
defendant manufactured the product43 and must otherwise be germane to
the particular characteristic of the specific type of product involved in the
dispute. 44 For example, to prove a design defect, a plaintiff may
introduce evidence that a defendant-manufacturer failed to comply with

an applicable industry standard for the design of a speed control
mechanism of an asphalt paver,45 a grader back-up alarm that was not
tamper-proof,46 power tools that vibrated excessively, 47 aircraft actuators
that could mistakenly be installed backwards,48 or the guarding of pinch

points on industrial machinery. 49 Similarly, in seeking to prove a warning
is defective, a plaintiff may demonstrate that the warning is inadequate
for failing to comply with industry standards concerning, for example,
the risk that a crane operator might be shocked if the crane were to hit
electrical wires, 5° that a kitchen cleaning chemical might cause severe

burns,5' or that a winch should use a safety-latched hook.52

238788, at *3 (because two-thirds of ANSI ladder standards committee members came
from outside the industry, "the standards are not evidence of 'custom and usage' within
an industry as contemplated" by standard jury instructions, so that court's failure to give
it was not error).
42See 3 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUcTs LIABILITY, supra note 26, § 18.04 [1].
Industry "custom," meaning prevailing use of technology, differs from the higher
standard of "state of the art," meaning the best technology reasonably available at the
time. See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 2, §§ 2.4 & 10.4.
43See, e.g., Hutchison v. Urschel Labs., Inc., 157 F.3d 613, 615 (8th Cir. 1998) (Mo.
law); Bottignoli v. Ariens Co., 560 A.2d 1261, 1266 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
44 See, e.g., Chapman v. Bernard's Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 406, 422-23 (D. Mass.
2001) (industry standards that plaintiff sought to use as evidence pertained to cribs,
toddler beds, and bunk beds, not daybeds like the one causing baby's death when he
slipped between its mattress and side rail).
45 See Alfred v. Caterpillar, Inc., 262 F.3d 1083 (10th Cir. 2001) (Okla. law) (Society
of Automotive Engineers ("SAE") standards called for control to be a lever rather than a rotary dial;
operator backed up, pinning plaintiff to tree, rather than proceeding forward as intended).
46 See Bohnstedt v. Robscon Leasing, LLC, 993 P.2d 135 (Okla. Civ. App. 1999).
47 See Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319 (Conn. 1997).
48 See Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1986).
49See, e.g., Masters v. Hesston Corp., 291 F.3d 985, 991 (7th Cir. 2002) (Ill. law)
(hay baler); Del Cid v. Beloit Corp., 901 F. Supp. 539, 545 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (plasticinjection molding machine), affd, No. 96-7009, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 15842 (2d Cir.
July 24, 1996).
50
See Evanoffv. Grove Mfg. Co., 650 N.E.2d 914, 919 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
"' See Westley v. Ecolab, Inc., No. Civ. A.03-CV-1372, 2004 WL 1068805, at *1
(E.D.52Pa. May 12, 2004).
See Beneway v. Superwinch, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 24, 30 (N.D.N.Y. 2002).
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By the same token, a manufacturer seeking to establish that its
prodtict's design is not defective53 may show that its product complied

with industry standards regarding,56 for example, a stepladder, 54 a chair,55
57
the fuel system of a pickup truck, the protective guard of a log skidder
or a grinder. 5 To refute a defective warnings claim, the manufacturer

may present evidence that it adequately complied with industry standards
for warnings and instructions for its product, such as a hot water heate 59 or
a trampoline.60 A manufacturer may also utilize compliance with industry
customs to prove that its product was free of manufacturing defects.6'
A great majority of jurisdictions maintain that a manufacturer's
compliance or noncompliance with industry custom is some evidence that the

5' PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT § 2(b) cmt. d (2004) explains the relevance of
industry custom to the feasibility requirement of design defect determinations:
This Section states that a design is defective if the product could have been
made safer by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design. If such a design
could have been practically adopted at time of sale and if the omission of such
a design rendered the product not reasonably safe, the plaintiff establishes
defect under Subsection (b). When a defendant demonstrates that its product
design was the safest in use at the time of sale, it may be difficult for the plaintiff to prove
that an alternative design could have been practically adopted. The defendant is
thus allowed to introduce evidence with regard to industry practice that bears
on whether an alternative design was practicable. Industry practice may also be
relevant to whether the omission of an alternative design rendered the product
not reasonably safe. While such evidence is admissible, it is not necessarily
dispositive. If the plaintiff introduces expert testimony to establish that a
reasonable alternative design could practically have been adopted, a trier of fact
may conclude that the product was defective notwithstanding that such a design
was not adopted by any manufacturer, or even considered for commercial use,
at the time of sale.
id.
54 See DiCarlo v. Keller Ladders, Inc., 211 F.3d 465, 468 (8th Cir. 2000) (Mo. law)
(ANSI standards; affirming judgment on verdict for manufacturer).
55 See Delery v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 643 So. 2d 807, 813 (La. Ct. App. 1994)
(ANSI standards).

56 See Ake v. Gen. Motors Corp., 942 F. Supp. 869, 874 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards for frontal crash barrier).
57 See Westfall v. Caterpillar, Inc., 821 P.2d 973, 976 (Idaho 1991).
58 See Clarke v. LR Sys., 219 F. Supp. 2d 323, 334 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (ANSI guarding
standard for grinders).
59 See Moore v. Miss. Valley Gas Co., 863 So. 2d 43, 46 (Miss. 2003) (American
Gas Association and ANSI standards for scald warnings).
60 See Anderson v. Hedstrom Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d 422, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(discussirg ASTM standards' relevance in deciding motion for summary judgement); Ford v. Naim,
717 N.E.2d 525, 530 (Il. App. Ct. 1999) (ASTM Standard F381--84; affirming summary
judgment for defendant).
61See, e.g., Emody v. Medtronic, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1294 (N.D. Ala. 2003)
(holding that "rod [in spinal fusion device] met ASTM standards for chemistry, hardness,
and for microstructure").
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product was or was not defective. 62 Occasionally, courts give such
evidence somewhat greater weight.63 A few state products liability
reform statutes address the topic. At least one provides that evidence of
industry custom and nongovernmental standards is admissible, 64 while
another accords a presumption of non-defectiveness to products that
"conformed to the generally recognized and prevailing standards."6 5
However, a small number of courts altogether refused to allow evidence
of industry custom on the issue of product defect in strict liability cases.
These courts reason that evidence of the manufacturers' customary
behavior with respect to safety issues improperly injects into a strict
liability case issues of conduct and due care that are irrelevant to the
legal standard of product defectiveness.6 6 Finally, borrowing from
62 Compare Alfred v. Caterpillar, Inc., 262 F.3d 1083, 1088 (10th Cir. 2001) (Okla.
law), with WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.050 (West 2004); Emody, 238 F. Supp. 2d at
1294; Ake v. Gen. Motors Corp., 942 F. Supp. 869, 874 (W.D.N.Y. 1996). See also
Hobson v. Waggoner Eng'g, Inc., No. 2001-CA-00908-COA, 2003 WL 21789396, at
* 12 (Miss. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2003) (affirming summary judgment for defendant where
plaintiff offered no evidence of industry standards, customs, or expert testimony as to
availability of safer alternative design).
63 See, e.g., Jordan v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., No. 95-5861, 1996 WL 662874, at *2
(6th Cir. Nov. 12, 1996) (Ky. law) ("[A] manufacturer rarely 'will be held liable for
failing to do what no one in his position has ever done before.' (quoting W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 33, at 167 (4th ed. 1971))); Del Cid v. Beloit Corp.,
901 F. Supp. 539, 545-49 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), af'd, No. 96-7009, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS
15842 (2d Cir. July 24, 1996); Mears v. Gen. Motors Corp., 896 F. Supp. 548, 551 (E.D.
Va. 1995) (noting that while compliance with industry practices does not conclusively
establish product's safety, manufacturer will seldom be liable for failing to adopt safety
measures no other member of industry employs); see also PRODUCTS LIABILITY
RESTATEMENT § 2(b) cmt. d (2004) ("When a defendant demonstrates that its product
design was the safest in use at the time of sale, it may be difficult for the plaintiffto prove
that an alternative design [required for a finding of design defect] could have been
practically adopted."); Vermett v. Fred Christen & Sons Co., 741 N.E.2d 954, 971 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2000) ("compliance with ANSI is a compelling factor").
64 See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 7.72.050(1) (West 2004) (stating that trier of fact
may consider such evidence with respect to design, warnings, or manufacturing defects).
" See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(2) (Banks-Baldwin 2004) ("[it shall be presumed,
until rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence to the contrary, that the product was not
defective if the design, methods of manufacture, and testing conformed to the generally
recognized and prevailing standards or the state of the art in existence at the time the
design was prepared, and the product was manufactured.").
66 See, e.g., Rexrode v. Am. Laundry Press Co., 674 F.2d 826, 831-32 (10th Cir.
1982) (Kan. law); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 378 (Ct. App. 1981)
("In a strict products liability case, industry custom or usage is irrelevant to the issue of
defect."); Lay v. P & G Health Care, Inc., 37 S.W.3d 310, 332 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000);
Lewis v. Coffing Hoist Div., Duff-Norton Co., 528 A.2d 590, 594 (Pa. 1987) (holding
that evidence of customary design of control box for hoist not admissible in strict
products liability action because such evidence introduces concepts of negligence,
focuses on manufacturer's conduct rather than condition of product, and distracts jury;
concurring judge, id. at 595, remarked that "a manufacturer cannot avoid liability to its
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negligence law's T. Hooper rule,67 courts in strict liability cases almost
universally maintain that evidence of a defendant's compliance 68 or
noncompliance 69 with industry safety standards does not conclusively
establish whether a product is defective.70 Yet, in unusual cases, proof of
a defendant's compliance 7' or noncompliance

72

may conceivably be a proper

basis for a dispositive determination of a product's defectiveness.

consumers that it injures or maims through its defective designs by showing that 'the
other guys do it too."').
New York cannot make up its mind. Compare Jemmott v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 628
N.Y.S.2d 184, 185 (App. Div. 1995) (stating that ANSI standards are inadmissible in strict
liability claims), with Anderson v. Hedstrom Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d 422, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(admissible); Ake, 942 F. Supp. at 874 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (same).
67 See The T.J. Hooper v. N. Barge Co., 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (discussed
in OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILrrY LAW, supra note 2, § 2.4).
68 See, e.g., Clarke v. LR Sys., 219 F. Supp. 2d 323, 334 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating
that, because compliance with ANSI standard was not dispositive of design defect issue,
other evidence on design and safety of machine may be considered); Brooks v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54, 64 (N.M. 1995) ("[I1n assessing whether a manufacturer was
negligent in adopting a particular product design or whether the product design poses an
unreasonable risk of injury, a court should not be restricted to determining whether the
manufacturer's design complied with any applicable government regulations and industry
standards. Such regulations and standards, while probative of what a reasonably prudent
manufacturer would do, should not be conclusive.").
69 See, e.g., Alfred v. Caterpillar, Inc., 262 F.3d 1083, 1088 (10th Cir. 2001) (Okla.
law); Poches v. J.J. Newberry Co., 549 F.2d 1166, 1168 (8th Cir. 1977) (S.D. law).
70 See, e.g., Del Cid v. Beloit Corp., 901 F. Supp, 539, 545 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)
("Compliance or lack of compliance with industry standards ... is not dispositive of the
issue of a design defect and other evidence concerning the design and safety of the
machine may be considered.") (citations omitted), af'd, No. 96-7009, 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 15842 (2d Cir. July 24, 1996); Allen v. Long Mfg. NC, Inc., 505 S.E.2d 354, 358
(S.C. Ct. App. 1998) (suggesting that compliance with an industry safety standard
conclusively establishes product's non-defectiveness is "unsound since it would allow
the industry to set its own standard of safety, a proposition which finds no support from
other jurisdictions, and which is antithetical to the underlying premise of strict liability").
See generally 3 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 26, § 18.04[1 ].
71 See Wilder v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 23 Fed. App. 155, 157 (4th Cir.
2001) (Va. law) ("While conformity with industry custom does not absolve a
manufacturer or seller of a product from liability, such compliance may be conclusive
when there is no evidence to show that the product was not reasonably safe.").
72 See generally James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on
Defective ProductDesign, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 867 (1998) (arguing that a defendant's
violation of a clear industry standard should be conclusive proof of a product's
defectiveness).
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B. Governmental Standardsand the Doctrine ofDefectiveness Per Se
1. Violation
The effect of a manufacturer's violation of a safety statute or
regulation on the issue of negligence in a products liability case is
controlled by the doctrine of negligence per se. This doctrine states that a
defendant's breach of an applicable statute or regulation-one addressing
the type of risk that harmed the plaintiff or a person in a similar position
to the plaintiff-is at least evidence (and possibly conclusive) of the
negligence issue.73 The question examined here is whether the law
recognizes an equivalent method of proving product defectiveness for
purposes of strict products liability in tort, a doctrine that might be
labeled "defectiveness per se."74
It is useful to remember that a finding of product defectiveness is
typically a kind of "lesser included offense" in a negligence determination,
since the latter nomially requires a conclusion that the defendant negligently
made or sold a defective product.75 In other words, a finding of
negligence (whether by normal proof or negligence per se) usually
implies a finding of defectiveness. So, if a plaintiff establishes
negligence per se, logically the plaintiff has also demonstrated that the
product was defective. 7 6 This is the premise of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability ("Restatement"), which sets out a defectiveness
per se principle in terms of traditional negligence per se.77 Section 4(a) of
the Restatement provides that "a product's noncompliance with an
applicable product safety statute or administrative regulation renders the

73 See generally OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 2, § 2.4.
74 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4(a) (2004); 1 AM.
LAW PROD. LIAB., supra note 26, § 12:10-38; 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY, supra note 26, § 10.03; 5 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra
note 26, § 55.02[3); MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 26, § 27.7;
see generally Christopher Scott D'Angelo, Effect Of Compliance With Applicable
Governmental ProductSafety Regulations On A Determination Of Product Defect, 36 S.
TEX. L. REV. 453 (1995); Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Use of Criminal Statutes to Regulate
Product Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1984); Joseph H. Ballway, Jr., Note, Products
Liability Based Upon Violation of Statutory Standards,64 MICH. L. REv. 1388 (1966).
75 This is especially true with defendant manufacturers. Other types of negligence
claims that are much less common include negligent misrepresenrlaion and negligent entrustment.
See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 2, §§ 2.2, 5.9, & 15.2.
76 See Elsworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 691 P.2d 630, 632 (Cal. 1984) (applying
negligence
per se doctrine to find defective design).
77
The formulation is traditional except that it conflates the conventional twopronged test-protecting (1) persons like plaintiff from (2) risks that caused harm-into a
single scope-of-risk prong.
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product defective with respect to the risks sought to be reduced by the
statute or regulation. ' 8 Acknowledging that the rule derives from the
doctrine of negligence per se,29 the Restatement extends the principle to
products liability theories, whether based on strict liability or traditional
negligence.8 0
a. Rationale
While a doctrine of defectiveness per se might appear logically
embedded in the concept of negligence per se, the underlying rationale of
any type of per se liability for breach of statute is unclear. Negligence per
se itself has always been theoretically suspect,8' and it is uncertain why a
statutory or regulatory violation should establish a product defect. The
idea may be that governmental product safety standards necessarily rest
on implicit determinations of product defectiveness by taking into
account consumer expectations and the costs and benefits of alternative
safety approaches. Or perhaps the notion is that consumers can
reasonably expect manufacturers to obey the law, but they cannot
reasonably expect more. 2 Rationales like these seem rather contrived.
The Restatement's purported policy explanation for the rule is
tautological, s3 which may reflect the fact that most courts that have
applied the per se principle to defectiveness in strict liability have
borrowed this approach from negligence law without critical
consideration. 84 Case law on the issue is sparse, and the few courts that
78RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4(a).

79See id. Reporters' Note to cmt. d.
8o Treating products liability doctrine broadly, without regard to distinctions
between the traditional claims (negligence, implied warranty, and strict liability in tort),
his consistent with the Third Restatement's "functional" approach to products liability
which seeks to transcend the different causes of action, melding them into simple
products liability claims. See id. §§ 1-4.
81See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 36, at 220-22 (W. Page
Keeton et al. eds., 1984).
82See Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 971 P.2d 500, 505-06 (Wash. 1999)
(en banc) ("Whether or not a product was in compliance with legislative or administrative
regulatory standards is merely relevant evidence that may be considered by the trier of
fact [together with the availability of feasible alternative designs, in determining] if the
product was unsafe to an extent beyond that which would be expected by an ordinary
consumer."); see also Eriksen v. Mobay Corp., 41 P.3d 488, 494 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002)
(stating that customers expect designs to comply with legislative regulations).
83 "The rule in [§ 4(a)] is based on the policy judgment that designs and warnings
that fail to comply with applicable safety standards established by statute or regulations
are ... defective." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4 cmt. d.
84The courts are not alone in assuming that the per se principle for breach of statute
may be transferred from negligence law to strict products liability. See, e.g., Robert L.
Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049, 2051 (2000) ("If, in fact,
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apply the doctrine are often federal courts sitting in diversity, sometimes
drawing support dubiously from one another. 85 In short, the doctrine of
defectiveness per se balances on a slender reed. But a couple of state
statutes,86 a handful of scattered opinions, 87 and the Restatement do

support this method of proving a product defect. For whatever reason, in
the final analysis a product's failure to meet minimal government safety

rules does seem somehow88 relevant, perhaps very relevant, to a
defectiveness determination.
b. Relevance
To be admissible in a product defect dispute, evidence of a statutory
violation must be relevant to that issue, which is another way of stating

that the plaintiff must have been injured by the risk the statute sought to
prevent.8 9 Probably the most contentious issue on the question of
relevancy concerns OSHA regulations that govern the guarding of
machinery and many other workplace safety matters. 90

OSHA's

machinery-guarding regulations are directed solely at employers rather
than manufacturers, which renders such regulations immensely suspect
in the halls of relevance. 91 Even so, both plaintiffs and defendants may
a regulation is taken to set a minimum standard of safety, a violation can surely be taken
to import responsibility as a matter of law.").
85 See id.

86 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-403(2) (West 2004) (violation creates a
rebuttable presumption of defectiveness); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3304(b) (2004)
(violation renders product defective unless manufacturer establishes that violation was
appropriate).
87See, e.g., Stanton v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 718 F.2d 553 (3d Cir. 1983) (Pa.
law) (holding that manufacturer of Xylocaine anesthetic was negligent per se for failing
to file adverse reaction reports required by FDA regulation; violation also rendered drug
defective under § 402A since FDA was unable to assure that warnings of adverse reactions
were disseminated to doctors); Lukaszewicz v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 510 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. Wis.
1981), amended by 532 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (holding that manufacturer of
Ortho-Novum birth control pills was negligent per se and liable under § 402A for failure
to warn user directly of side effects pursuant to FDA regulation).
88"Indeed, it seems anomalous to accord such a standard of conduct, promulgated
by the community through its elected representatives, anything less than the force
of law ... in the context of a civil suit." Ballway, supra note 74, at 1391.
89 See, e.g., Hagan v. Gemstate Mfg., Inc., 982 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Or. 1999)
(requiring, in a trailer-accident case the lower courts look to a regulation's purpose when
determining relevance).
90
See 3 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 26, § 18.05[3].
91See, e.g., Gray v. Navistar Int'l Corp., 630 N.Y.S.2d 596, 598 (App. Div. 1995)
(truck not equipped with back-up beeping device; OSHA standards inadmissible);
Jemmott v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 628 N.Y.S2d 184 (App. Div. 1995) (finding OSHA standards
regarding press guarding inadmissible).
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seek to have such standards admitted into evidence in a products liability
case. 92 Quite naturally, a plaintiff will want to demonstrate that the
manufacturer failed to adopt the pertinent OSHA standard. Machineguarding and most other OSHA safety regulations are not directed at
manufacturers, 93 so that their breach by employers cannot establish a
manufacturer's liability per se. However, such standards may prescribe
the types of safety devices a federal workplace safety agency deems
necessary for the safety of particular machinery and thus help define the
standard of acceptable safety practices-the prevailing custom-in the
industry of machinery manufacturers.9 4 Therefore, while plaintiffs
sometimes introduce evidence of OSHA standards, manufacturers will
do so as well. 95 Arguing that it cannot violate a safety regulation that

applies only to employers, a manufacturer of industrial machinery may
seek to use such a regulation to inform the jury (if indirectly) of two

important points: 1) that the employer, which is not a party in a products
liability action, 96 was primarily responsible for the accident because it
owed and breached a duty under federal law to protect the worker; 97 and

92 See, e.g., Hannah v. Gregg, Bland & Berry, Inc., 840 So. 2d 839 (Ala. 2002)
(OSHA standards admissible to show that defendant, who reconfigured machinery,
should have noticed that absence of barrier guard was safety hazard); Couch v. Astec
Indus., 53 P.3d 398, 403-04 (N.M. 2002) (OSHA standards admissible as custom).
93 Note that other OSHA regulations, such as the OSHA Hazard Communication
Standard, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(g)(6)(i) (2004), requiring manufacturers and importers
of chemicals to supply purchasers with Material Safety Data Sheets, are indeed directed
at employers. See, e.g., Messer v. Amway Corp., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1230 (D. Kan.
2002), ajf'd, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 16445 (10th Cir. 2004).
94 See, e.g., Couch, 53 P.3d at 403-04 (admitting OSHA standards as evidence of
custom); Hannah, 840 So. 2d at 849 (admitting OSHA standards to show that defendant,
who reconfigured machinery, should have noticed that absence of barrier guard was
safety hazard). See generally DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 133, at 313 (2000).
But cf. 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4), (providing that the OSHA statute does not affect the
common law "rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and employees").
95 See, e.g., Sims v. Washex Mach. Corp., 932 S.W.2d 559, 565 (Tex. Ct. App.
1995) (stating that machine's compliance with OSHA regulations was "strong evidence"
that it was not defective); Slisze v. Stanley-Bostitch, 979 P.2d 317, 321 (Utah 1999)
(allowing introduction of OSHA standards to establish rebuttable presumption of
nondefectiveness).
96 Workers' compensation statutes protect employers from tort suits by employees in
exchange for providing workers compensation insurance benefits. See OWEN, PRODUCTS
LLABILITY LAW, supra note 2, § 15.6.
97 See, e.g., Brodsky v. Mile High Equip. Co., 69 Fed. App. 53, 56-57 (3d Cir. 2003)
(Pa. law) (admitting evidence that OSHA imposed fines upon decedent's employer for
failing to properly train employee to show that employer's intervening negligence was a
superseding cause of employee's death); Porchia v. Design Equip. Co., 113 F.3d 877, 881
(8th Cir. 1997) (Ark. law) (admitting this information to help determine whether
employer's actions were the sole proximate cause of injury). But see Colegrove v.
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2) that the injured worker is already being compensated by workers'
compensation benefits and thus will not be left destitute if the jury finds
the product not defective. Deciding how best to mesh workers'
compensation and products liability law is an exceedingly complex
issue. 98 Clearly, however, violations of OSHA regulations applicable
only to employers simply cannot establish product defectiveness per se. 99
While some courts bar the admission of such evidence as irrelevant'00 or
confusing,' 0' others allow it against manufacturers to 0portray
the
2
environment in which industrial machines are sold and used.1
c. Application

Most strict liability in tort cases concerning noncompliance with
safety statutes and regulations involve alleged defects in a product's

warnings' 0 3 or design.'" The Restatement limits the per se principle to

Cameron Mach. Co., 172 F. Supp. 2d 611, 617-18 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (irrelevant and

inadmissible).
98 See OWEN, PRODUCTs LIABILrrY LAW, supra note 2, § 15.6.
99
See, e.g., Jemmott v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 628 N.Y.S.2d 184,185 (App. Div. 1995) (OSHA
press uarding standards inadmissible).
See, e.g., Colegrove, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 617-18.
01See, e.g., Byrne v. Liquid Asphalt Sys., Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 491, 493 (E.D.N.Y.
2002) (refusing to admit OSHA standards, which are not intended to impose duties upon
manufacturers, because they would likely mislead or confuse jury).
102See, e.g., Messer v. Amway Corp., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1230 (D. Kan. 2002);
Couch v. Astec Indus., Inc., 53 P.3d 398, 403-04 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002); Hagan v.
Gemstate Mfg., Inc., 982 P.2d 1108, 1113 (Or. 1999). For a discussion of a
manufacturer's use of OSHA standards against plaintiffs, see OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LAW, supra note 2, § 14.3.
103See, e.g., Stanton v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 565 (3d Cir. 1983)
(Pa. law) (holding that manufacturer of Xylocaine anesthetic was properly found liable
under § 402A for failing to file adverse reaction reports required by FDA regulation,
since FDA was unable to assure that warnings of adverse reactions were disseminated to
doctors); Lukaszewicz v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 510 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. Wis.) (finding a
manufacturer of Ortho-Novum birth control pills negligent per se, and liable under
§ 402A, for failure to warn user directly of side effects pursuant to FDA regulation, 21
CFR § 310.501), amended by 532 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Wis. 1981); Toole v. RichardsonMerrell Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 409 (Ct. App. 1967) (same result with drug MER/29).
104 See, e.g., Ellis v. K-Lan Co., 695 F.2d 157, 161-62 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1983) (Tex.
law) (dictum) (discussing whether drain--cleaner cap design complied with or violated
Special Packaging of Household Substances for Protection of Children Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1471-76, and regulations thereunder; such evidence was admissible but not conclusive
on design defectiveness); Bennett v. PRC Pub. Sector, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 484, 501 (S.D.
Tex. 1996) (discussing NIOSH standards for design of work station that caused repetitive
motion injury); McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 188 Cal. Rptr. 542, 547 (Ct. App. 1983)
(finding that aircraft firewalls between engine and passenger compartment failed to meet
FAA requirement that they resist flame penetration for at least fifteen minutes); Brooks v.
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these types of cases,

105

but a safety statute or regulation may pertain to

manufacturing defects as well. For example, a regulation may prescribe
the maximum level of contamination or flaws allowable in products
(such as food, 10 6 drugs, 7 or lumber" 8 ) or the appropriate manufacturing
processes for medical materials. 0 9 In this context, the Restatement's per

se principle would seem to apply with equal force and logic.
d. Restatement
The Restatement provides

that a products

liability defendant

generally may not avail itself of the array of excuses and justifications
for violating a statute or regulation allowed in ordinary negligence
law,' 1 reasoning that excuses are not applicable where a manufacturer
has occasion to know the facts and safety standards and has time to
conform its behavior to the standard's provisions."1 ' It is true that valid
justifications for violating safety statutes and regulations will arise less
frequently in the products liability context than in ordinary negligence

contexts, where emergencies and reasonable mistakes more commonly
occur without notice of clear safety standards. But case authority for the
12
Restatement's dual position is ephemeral, to say the least,' and courts

might well be leery of adopting a truly "strict" form of liability for
Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54, 64 (N.M. 1995) (arguing that absence of shoulder
harnesses in private airplane rendered it uncrashworthy); Hall v. Fairmont Homes, Inc.,
664 N.E.2d 546, 556 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (discussing whether levels of formaldehyde
fumes emitted by mobile home construction materials exceeded HUD regulations).
105See discussion supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
106 See Coffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 226 S.E.2d 534, 538 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976)
(examining case where plaintiff injured teeth biting down on unshelled nut in bottle of
shelled nuts; statute and regulation allowing 1.00% to 2.50% unshelled peanuts per unit
of shelled peanuts).
107 See St. Louis Univ. v. United States, 182 F. Supp. 2d 494, 498 (D. Md. 2002)
(holding that polio vaccine did not meet federal "neurovirulence" standards).
108 See Holder v. Keller Indus., No. 05-97-01168-CV, 2000 WL 141070 (Tex. Ct.
App. Feb. 9, 2000) (suggesting that low density wood may have violated ANSI
standards).
1o9 See Reiter v. Zimmer Inc., 897 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (discussing how
blending times for loads of prosthesis implant cement met FDA "good manufacturing
processes"):
10
o See PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT § 4(a) cmt. d (2004).
11 Id.

112 See D'Angelo, supra note 74, at 469 (asserting that only one state, Alaska,
accords such violations conclusive effect). The Reporters cite another Alaska case,
Bachnerv. Rich, 554 P.2d 430 (Alaska 1976), but Bachner was a workplace safety action
against a contractor in which the court acknowledged the general availability of excuses
the facts.
to negligence per se, but found them inapplicable to
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design and warnings cases without allowing truly justifiable violations of

statutory and regulatory safety standards.' 13
Jurisdictions vary in the weight given to a finding of noncompliance
with a governmental safety standard. Most of the few opinions on point
treat the violation of a safety standard as evidence of a product's
defectiveness. 1 4 In a few states, such a violation gives rise to a
presumption of defectiveness that may shift the burden of proof.1 5 At
least one court holds that breach of such a provision conclusively

establishes that the product is defective,1 16 a position endorsed by the

113 Cf. St. Louis Univ. v. United States, 182 F. Supp. 2d 494 (D. Md. 2002) (noting

that some of nation's best scientists, employed by NIH to enforce polio vaccine
"neurovirulence" standards, approved a vaccine that did not comply with those standards
because they believed the standards, subsequently abolished, were unreasonably high).
114 See, e.g., Redman v. John D. Brush & Co., 111 F.3d 1174, 1177-78 (4th Cir.
1997) (Va. law) (stating, in dictum, that courts should consider whether a product's
design meets relevant standards); Ellis v. K-Lan Co., 695 F.2d 157, 161 (5th Cir. 1983)
(Tex. law) (discussing federal child-packaging rules for household substances);
(violation or compliance with federal child-packaging rules for household substances;
"while plainly relevant, would not have been conclusive of its product's defectiveness or
fitness"); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.050(l) (West 2004); Gibson v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 2d 443, 447 (W.D. Va. 2002) (finding no violation of
relevant federal regulations governing packaging of charcoal lighter fluid: "[In
determniing what constitutes an unreasonably dangerous defect, a court will consider safety
standards promulgated by the government or the relevant industry, as well as the
reasonable expectations of consumers.") (quoting Alevromagiros v. Hechinger Co., 993
F.2d 417, 420 (4th Cir. 1993)); Bennett v. PRC Public Sector, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 484, 501
(S.D. Tex. 1996) (holding that government standards are relevant to, but not conclusive
of, worker's claim that workstation was defectively designed); Quay v. Crawford, 788
So. 2d 76, 84 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (discussing a federal trucking regulation requiring
effective rear underride guard); Hall v. Fairmont Homes, 664 N.E.2d 546, 551 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1995) (finding that formaldehyde emissions from materials used in mobile home
exceeded HUD standards).
1"5 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-403(2) (West 2004) (rebuttable
presumption); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3304(b) (2003) (deeming product defective unless
manufacturer shows that violation was reasonably prudent action); McGee v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 188 Cal. Rptr. 542, 457 (Ct. App. 1983) (discussing the FAA specification
that aircraft firewalls between engine and passenger compartment resist flame penetration
for at least fifteen minutes). See also OWEN, PRODucTs LIABILITY LAW, supra note 2,
§ 14.3 (discussing the rebuttable presumption approach in the context of the regulatory
compliance defense).
116 See Stanton v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 569-71 (3d Cir. 1983)
(Pa. law) (finding manufacturer of Xylocaine anesthetic failed to file adverse reaction
reports required by FDA regulation rendering drug defective under § 402A, since FDA
was unable to assure that warnings of adverse reactions were disseminated to doctors).

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 93

what was thought to be the conventional
Restatement,117 which parallels
118
rule in negligence per se.
In sum, the putative doctrine of "defectiveness per se" is
undeveloped and ethereal. To the extent that this doctrine does exist, the
cases suggest that a defendant's noncompliance with an applicable safety
statute or regulation may be considered evidence, though not dispositive,
of a product's defectiveness.
2. Compliance
The rule regarding a manufacturer's compliance with governmental
safety standards largely mimics the rule regarding violations: compliance
with a safety standard is widely considered proper, but inconclusive,
evidence of a product's non-defectiveness.1 1 9 Notwithstanding such
compliance, a jury normally is free to find a warning or design
"defective" because governmental safety requirements generally are set
at minimally acceptable levels. 120 Section 4(b) of the Restatement is in
117See PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT §
8

4(a) (2004).
1 See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIAILITxY LAW, supra note 2, § 2.4. Most assertions to this
effect draw their support from other sources from the 1940s, 1930s, or earlier. Research
has uncovered no recent jurisdictional tally.
"9 See, e.g., Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 310 F.3d 461, 473-74 (6th Cir. 2002), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 157 L. Ed. 2d 12 (2003) (Ky. law) (holding that

compliance with door latch test did not exempt defendant from liability); Quintana-Ruiz
v. Hyundai Motor Corp., 303 F.3d 62, 74 (1st Cir. 2002) (P.R. law) ("States may impose
liability under their products liability statutes even if the manufacturer or seller meets the
minimum federal standards.") (quoting Rivera-Santana, 1992 P.R.-Eng. 754830, 1992 WL
754830 D.P.R. Dec. 9, 1992); Moss v. Parks Corp., 985 F.2d 736, 741 (4th Cir. 1993)
(CPSC labeling regulations for paint thinner, under Federal Hazardous Substances Act);
O'Gilvie v. Int'l Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1443 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that
compliance with FDA-mandated warning of toxic shock syndrome on tampons was
evidence of nondefectiveness, but was not conclusive); Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co.,
736 F.2d 1529, 1540 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (discussing EPA-approved label for paraquat
herbicide, under Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act); Contini v.
Hyundai Motor Co., 840 F. Supp. 22, 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (compliance with NHTSA
seat-belt regulations); Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 661 (Cal. 1973)
(FDA). See also WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 7.72.050(1) (West 2004); Burch v. Amsterdam
Corp., 366 A.2d 1079, 1085 (D.C. 1976) (Federal Hazardous Substances Act); Gable v. Vill. of
Gates Mills, 784 N.E.2d 739, 747-48 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (holding that compliance
with airbag regulation may be a guide but is not conclusive of nonliability), rev'd, 816
N.E.2d 1049 (Ohio 2004); Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 971 P.2d 500, 505-06
(Wash. 1999) (finding that design of window, through which child fell, complied with
building and fire codes; compliance merely evidence of nondefectiveness).
120 See, e.g., Kurer v. Parke, Davis & Co., 679 N.W.2d 867, 875 (Wis. Ct. App.

2004), review denied, 684 N.W.2d 137 (Wis. 2004) (drug warnings). Perhaps the classic
examples of extraordinarily minimal standards in a federal "safety" act are the
flammability standards in the Flammable Fabrics Act; Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp.,
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accord, providing that, in connection with liability for defective design or
warnings:
a product's compliance with an applicable product safety statute or
administrative regulation is properly considered in determining whether
the product is defective with respect to the risks sought to be reduced
does not preclude as a
by the statute or regulation, but such compliance
12
matter of law a finding of product defect. '
Some states provide that a manufacturer's compliance with an
applicable statute or regulation gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that
the product is not defective. 22 In unusual situations, a court may rule as a
matter of law that a defendant's conformity to a statutory or regulatory
safety standard amounts to due care. 123 This principle of special
applicability surely applies to claims for strict liability torts as well.

II. OTHER SIMILAR ACCIDENTS
A common, and often persuasive, form of proof of defectiveness is
evidence of other similar accidents. 124 Plaintiffs commonly offer such
484 F.2d 1025, 1027 (1st Cir. 1973) (N.H. law); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297
N.W.2d 727, 733-35 (Minn. 1980). Needham v. Coordinated Apparel Group, 811 A.2d
124, 131 (Vt. 2002).
121PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT § 4 (b).
122 See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-403(1)(b) (West 2004); IND. CODE
ANN. § 34-20-5-1(2) (West 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3304(a) (2003); Gen. Motors
Corp. v. Harper, 61 S.W.3d 118, 124 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (in considering design of

seatbelt restraint system in 1990 GM pickup truck in which driver's spine was fractured
in head-on collision "[c]ompliance with NHTSA regulations provides a presumption of
no design defect."), petition for review denied, 2004 Tex. LEXIS 454 (Tex. May 14,
2004); see also Cansler v. Mills, 765 N.E.2d 698 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (reversing where
presumption was rebutted; summary judgment for manufacturer); McClain v- ChemLube Corp., 759 N.E.2d 1096 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that evidence of compliance
supports finding a genuine issue of material fact).
123 See, e.g., Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 863 P.2d 167, 172 & 176-77 (Cal. 1993)
(holding that compliance with FDA's English-language-only warning requirement
shielded drug manufacturer from also having to warn in Spanish that giving aspirin to
children might cause Reyes Syndrome); Beatty v. Trailmaster Prods., Inc., 625 A.2d 1005,
1014 (Md. 1993) (compliance with bumper-height statute was complete defense); see
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16 cmt e (Tentative Draft
Nov. 1, 2001) (stating that in "unusual situations," statutory or regulatory compliance
may be conclusive); cf. Taylor v. Smithldine Beecham Corp., 658 N.W.2d 127 (Mich.
2003) (upholding as constitutional a Michigan statute shielding drug manufacturers from
liability if their drugs comply with FDA regulations).
124 See generally 3 AM. LAW PROD. LIAB., supra note 26, §§ 14:28-46; KENNETH S.
BROUN, ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 200 (John Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999)
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evidence to show, circumstantially, that a product has a dangerous or
defective condition, the defendant had notice of it, and the defect caused

the plaintiff's injury. Less often, defendants offer evidence to prove the
absence of other similar accidents:

that a product's condition was not

especially dangerous, that the defendant had no reason to know about it,
or that it did not cause the plaintiffs harm. In addition, such evidence is
sometimes allowed to rebut or impeach the other party's witness.' 25
Plaintiff attorneys consider other-accident evidence to be an especially
powerful form of proof,126 while defense attorneys view it as largely, if
not entirely, irrelevant27 and prejudicial to the fair adjudication of a
products liability case.'

[hereinafter MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE]; 3 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY,
supra note 26, § 18.02; G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5.17 (3d
ed. 1996) [hereinafter LILLY ON EVIDENCE]; 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY,
supra note 26, § 27:4; 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 401.08[2] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN's
FEDERAL EVIDENCE]; 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 458
(Chadbourn rev. 1979) [hereinafter WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE]; 22 CHARLES WRIGHT &
KENNETH GRAHAM, JR., FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 5170 (2004) [hereinafter FED. PRAC. &
PROC.]; Clarence Morris, Proofof Safety History in Negligence Cases, 61 HARV. L. REV.
205 (1948); Robert A. Sachs, "Other Accident" Evidence in Product Liability Actions:
Highly Probative or an Accident Waiting to Happen?, 49 OKLA. L. REV. 257 (1996);
Thomas R. Maila, Annotation, Products Liability: Admissibility of Evidence of Absence
ofOther Accidents, 51 A.L.R. 4TH 1186 (1987).
125 See, e.g., Samuel v. Ford Motor Co., 112 F. Supp. 2d 460 (D. Md. 2000), affid
sub nom. Berger v. Ford Motor Co., 95 Fed. App. 520 (4th Cir. 2004) (admitting expert
evidence to rebut evidence disparaging vehicle performance); Hale v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 820 F.2d 928, 934-35 (8th Cir. 1987) (allowing evidence of other explosions
of identical multi-piece tire rims to impeach defendant's expert), critically noted in
Anthony Frazier, Note, The Admissibility of Similar Incidents in Product Liability
Actions, 53 Mo. L. REV. 547 (1988).
126 See, e.g., Francis H. Hare, Jr., Admissibility of Evidence Concerning Other Similar
Incidents in a Defective Design Product Case: Courts Should Determine "Similarity" by
Reference to the Defect Involved, 21 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 491 (1998); see also Tab
Turner, Proving Design Defects with Other Similar Incidents Evidence, 35 TRIAL 42
(1999) (discussing techniques for finding and using such evidence in auto cases).
127 See, e.g., Kevin Reynolds & Richard J. Kirschman, The Ten Myths of Product
Liability, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 551, 570-72 (2000) (finding other-accident
evidence peculiarly subject to misuse by jury; discussing limiting instructions and
strategy for exclusion). See generally Ronald L. Carlson, Is Revised Expert Witness Rule
703 a CriticalModernizationfor the New Century?, 52 FLA. L. REV. 715 (2000); Sachs,
supra note 124, at 257.
An analogous evidentiary issue concerns "comparative risk" evidence. Defense
attorneys in ATV and other high-risk product cases sometimes attempt to introduce
studies comparing the risks of ATVs to other recreational off-road vehicles such as
snowmobiles, minibikes, and trail bikes. These studies sometimes compare ATVs to such
dissimilar products and activities as flying, skydiving, scuba diving, swimming, skiing,
boating, bicycling, and horseback riding. Some courts have allowed such evidence for
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A. Relevance
Other-accident evidence may be relevant to any of the following three

factual matters commonly disputed in products liability litigation: (1) the
nature and extent of a product's dangerous condition, 128 (2) the
defendant's awareness of that condition, 129 and (3) the causal relationship
between the condition and the plaintiff's harm."o Assume, for example,
that a driver is injured in a rollover of a sport utility vehicle ("SUV")."I
Each of these three matters might be controverted, for example, in an
action against the SUV's manufacturer for injuries in a rollover that
occurred during a particular steering maneuver on a particular grade at a
particular speed. Evidence of one hundred accidents involving the same

model SUV under similar circumstances might tend to show all three
facts: (1) that this model SUV is especially prone to rolling over under
these particular conditions; (2) that the manufacturer was informed of
this danger because of the large number of similar accidents; and (3) that
certain aspects of the vehicle's design (and perhaps the absence of
adequate warnings and instructions) may have contributed to the
accidents. In short, other-accident evidence may be probative of a
product's dangerous condition, 132 notice to the manufacturer of the
some purposes. See, e.g., Kava v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 48 P.3d 1170, 1173-76 (Alaska
2002); Bittner v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 533 N.W.2d 476,479-87 (Wis. 1995). See generally 3
FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 26, § 18.01.
128These factors comprise the P x L side of the Hand risk-utility formula for
negligence and defectiveness, examined in OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note
2, at chs. 2, 5, & 8.
129 More particularly, this is the issue of notice, actual or constructive (that
defendant knew or should have known), which commonly includes foreseeability.
130See Arabian Agric. Servs. Co. v. Chief Indus., Inc., 309 F.3d 479, 485 (8th Cir.
2002) (Neb. law) (allowing evidence that other silos of manufacturer also collapsed
because "'[e]vidence of other accidents may be relevant to prove the defendant's notice
of defects, the defendant's ability to correct known defects, the magnitude of the danger,
the product's lack of safety for intended uses, or causation."') (citation omitted); Nissan
Motor Co. v. Armstrong 32 S.W.3d 701, 710 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that 750
reports of others incidents of unintended acceleration of Nissan 300ZX is admissible to
rebut manufacturer's claim that driver error caused accident and to show notice), revd,
145 S.W.3d 131 (Tex. 2004).
131Cf McCathem v. Toyota Motor Corp., 23 P.3d 320, 327 (Or. 2001) (finding that,
in the case of a Toyota 4Runner rollover, the existence of fifteen other substantially
similar incidents was relevant to understanding expert's opinion).
132 See, e.g., Lovick v. Wil-Rich, 588 N.W.2d 688, 697-98 (Iowa
1999), modified,
588 N.W.2d 688 (Iowa. 1999) (involving a cultivator wing that fell on plaintiff after he
removed a pin; evidence of other accidents showed dangerous location of wing lock
bracket subjecting operator to risk from collapse); Santos v. Chrysler Corp., 715 N.E.2d
47, 53 (Mass. 1999) (holding that similar occurrences of rear of minivan skidding after
hand application of the brakes is relevant to dangerousness, defect, and notice).
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condition, 133 or causation linking the condition to the accident.
Moreover, because punitive damages may be based upon a defendant's
failure to address a serious hazard of which it is aware, 135136evidence of
other similar accidents may be relevant to this issue as well.
Some courts may admit other-accident evidence as proof of either a
manufacturer's negligence or the product's defectiveness.137 While such
evidence may indeed help prove these things, it logically establishes only

foreseeability, notice, and the type and level of danger of the similar
products. 38 At best, such evidence provides only circumstantial proof

that a shared design feature or absence of a warning (including the one
that harmed the plaintiff) was dangerous, or that the danger was a
133See, e.g., Toole v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 235 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2000) (ninety-two
breast implant complaints relevant to fragility of product, although only thirteen resulted

from rupture by closed capsulotomy); Jones v. Ford Motor Co., 559 S.E.2d 592, 601 (Va.
2002) (sudden acceleration of vehicle); Gerow v. Mitch Crawford Holiday Motors, 987
S.W.2d 359, 364-65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (crashworthiness); Waddill v. Anchor Hocking,
Inc., 27 P.3d 1092 (Or. Ct. App. 2001), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 538 U.S. 974
(2003) (discussing notice that fish bowl might shatter in one's hands; failure to warn of
necessity to inspect fish bowl for small dings or cracks); see also McClure v. Walgreen
Co., 613 N.W.2d 225, 234 (Iowa 2000) (holding that thirty-four reports of misfilled
prescriptions over three-year period admissible for punitive damages to show notice of
problem without effort to cure it).
134 See, e.g., Arabian, 309 F.3d at 485 (allowing evidence that other silos of
manufacturer also collapsed because "[elvidence of other accidents may be relevant to
prove the defendant's notice of defects, the defendant's ability to correct known defects,
the magnitude of the danger, the product's lack of safety for intended uses, or causation")
(quoting Lovett v. Union Pac. R.R., 201 F.3d 1074, 1081 (8th Cir. 2000)); Nissan Motor,
32 S.W.3d at 712 (holding that 750 reports of others incidents of unintended acceleration
of Nissan 300ZX are admissible to show notice and rebut manufacturer's claim that
driver error caused accident); Newman v. Ford Motor Co., 975 S.W.2d 147, 152 (Mo.
1998) (holding that evidence of five other rear-end collisions was properly admitted in
case involving ejection from seat that collapsed despite passenger's wearing seatbelt,
with limiting instruction that jury consider the evidence only for determining seatbelt's
effectiveness in restraining occupants, not for determining defectiveness).
135See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 2, at ch. 18.
136See, e.g., Preston v. Mont. Eighteenth Jud. Dist. Ct., 936 P.2d 814, 819 (Mont.
1997). But see Kopczick v. Hobart Corp., 721 N.E.2d 769, 776 (I11. App. Ct. 1999)
(reversing $20 million punitive damages verdict against manufacturer of meat saw
because, while notice of prior accidents is relevant to punitive damages, thirty prior
accidents are insufficient to put manufacturer of widely used, inherently dangerous
product on notice that it was unreasonably dangerous).
137 See, e.g., Carballo-Rodriguez v. Clark Equip. Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 66, 73-74
(D.P.R. 2001) (design defect, warnings defect, negligence, and notice); Smith v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 214 F.3d 1235, 1248-49 (10th Cir. 2000) (N.M. law)
(defectiveness); Santos v. Chrysler Corp., 715 N.E.2d 47, 52-53 (Mass. 1999)
(defectiveness).
138See, e.g., Melton v. Deere & Co., 887 F.2d 1241, 1245 (5th Cir. 1989) ("The
question is not simply danger itself but unreasonable dangerousness as measured by
consumer expectations.").
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common cause of the accidents. However, to prevail in a strict products
liability or negligence action, a plaintiff must go beyond simply proving
that the product that injured him was dangerous. In strict products
liability, the plaintiff must also prove that the product's design or the
absence of warning was defective. In a negligence action, the plaintiff
must further prove that the defendant
was negligent for selling the
t39
product in such a dangerous condition.

In addition to evidence that a product's condition was dangerous,
both negligence and strict liability generally require additional proof that
the dangerous condition was both foreseeable and reasonably
preventable. 140 Other-accident evidence may help establish foreseeability
because a manufacturer is likely to have learned about such accidents,
particularly if they are numerous or severe. Indeed, the more numerous

and serious the similar accidents caused by a product, the more likely it
is that the manufacturer knew or should have known of the product's
danger, thus providing the manufacturer with actual or constructive

notice of the danger. But other-accident evidence does not help establish
the second requirement: the availability of a reasonable alternative
design or warning that could have prevented the plaintiffs
accident. For
4
this, the plaintiff must provide other types of proof.' 1
B. SubstantialSimilarity
The relevancy of other-accident evidence depends largely on

whether other accidents are "substantially similar" to the plaintiffs
accident. 142 First, the product involved in the other accidents must be the
to have injured the plaintiff.143

same as or similar to the product claimed

139 See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 2, at ch. 2.
140 See id. chs. 2, 5, & § 10.4.
141In particular, proof by expert testimony that a reasonable alternative design or
waming was available when the product was made and sold. See id. § 6.3.
142 "In products liability cases, the 'rule of substantial similarity' prohibits the
admission into evidence of other transactions, occurrences, or claims unless the
proponent first shows that there is a 'substantial similarity' between the other
transactions, occurrences, or claims and the claim at issue in the litigation." Cooper Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Crosby, 543 SE.2d 21, 23 (Ga. 2001); see also Lovick v. Wil-Rich, 588
N.W.2d 688, 697 (Iowa 1999) ("[A] foundational showing must indicate the prior
accidents occurred under substantially the same circumstances.").
143 See, e.g., Ray v. Ford Motor Co., 514 S.E.2d 227, 230-31 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that 546 other incidents of inadvertent vehicle movement were properly
excluded where database was not limited to any year or model of vehicle). But see Smith
v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 214 F.3d 1235, 1248 (10th Cir. 2000) (N.M. law) (discussing
different models, but with same design problem: "The substantial similarity rule does not
require identical products; nor does it require us to compare the products in their
entireties [but only as to] variables relevant to the plaintiff's theory of defect."); Santos v.
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The relevance of such evidence also rests on the similarity between the
principal causative facts and circumstances involved in the other
accident's and those in the plaintiff's case. Accordingly, evidence of other
accidents generally is admissible if the plaintiff establishes their
substantial similarity to the plaintiff's accident in both the product type
and usage contexts.'44 Such evidence will be excluded in the absence of
such qualifications. 145 But "similar" does not mean identical, 146 and

evidence of other accidents is admissible if the facts and circumstances
surrounding the accidents are shown to be reasonably similar. 147 The jury
Chrysler Corp., 715 N.E.2d 47, 53 (Mass. 1999) (holding that six other incidents of rearwheel lockup in minivan admissible, although five minivans were from different model
years and four had braking systems with different design features); see also Preston v.
Mont. Eighteenth Jud. Dist. Ct., 936 P.2d 814 (Mont. 1997) (finding that trial court erred
in restricting discovery of similar accidents to those involving specific model involved in
plaintiff's accident).
,44 See, e.g., Arabian Agric. Servs. Co. v. Chief Indus., Inc., 309 F.3d 479, 485 (8th
Cir. 2002) (Neb. law) (allowing other silos manufactured by defendant which collapsed
in similar manner as plaintiff's); Santos, 715 N.E.2d at 52-53 (using other instances of
minivans skidding due to hard application of breaks); Newman v. Ford Motor Co., 975
S.W.2d 147, 152 (Mo. 1998) (involving situation where other occupants were thrown
from seats despite wearing seatbelts); Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977
S.W.2d 328 (Tex. 1998) (allowing other accidents with 16" tire, although the plaintiff's
tires had a pictographic warning); Jones v. Ford Motor Co., 559 S.E.2d 592, 602 (Va.
2002) (using prior accidents from cars accelerating without warning).
145See, e.g., Lovett v. Union Pac. R.R., 201 F.3d 1074, 1080-81 (8th Cir. 2000)
(involving four other vehicular accidents); Pickel v. Automated Waste Disposal, Inc., 782
A.2d 231, 237 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001) (involving other incident of lid suddenly closing on
person using dumpster); Cooper Tire, 543 S.E.2d at 23 (involving tire failure from
separation of radial belting; adjustment data for all types of tires manufactured at same
plant over nine years with no substantial similarity of design, manufacturing process,
defect, or causation); Mercer v. Pittway Corp., 616 N.W.2d 602, 616 (Iowa 2000)
of same model fire alarm); Palmer v. Volkswagen
(involving 116 consumer complaints of failure
of Am., No. 2001-CA-00875-COA, 2003 WL 22006296, *28 (Miss. Ct. App. Aug. 26,
2003) (holding that two other accidents in which person was killed by airbag were not
substantially similar to plaintiff's accident), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 2005 Miss.
LEXIS 21 (Miss. Jan. 13, 2005); Gable v. Vill. of Gates Mills, 784 N.E.2d 739, 745
(Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (holding that airbag injury incidents, to be relevant, must involve
victims of similar size, gender, and position in same seat; evidence of previous airbag
816 N.E.2d 1049 (Ohio
injury involved female driver rather than male passenger), rev "d,
2004).
146 See, e.g., Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 310 F.3d 461, 473 (6th Cir. 2002), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 540 U.S. 801 (2003) (Ky. law) ("In order to prove ...that
an accident occurred under similar circumstances, it is not necessary to prove that the
prior accidents involved a vehicle identical to the one driven by [decedent] or that all of
the circumstances of the accidents are identical."); Smith, 214 F.3d at 1248-49.
147 See, e.g., Moulton v. Rival Co., 116 F.3d 22, 26-27 (1st Cir. 1997) (Me. law)
(holding that reports to potpourri pot manufacturer of previous burns to young children
were admissible despite difference in circumstances); Lovick, 588 N.W.2d at 697-98 (involving
several prior instances of farm cultivator wings falling on farm workers); Ulm v. Ford
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may also consider any dissimilarities when evaluating the weight of the
evidence. 148 It is sometimes noted that the substantial similarity
requirement is heightened if the other incidents are offered to prove
defectiveness or causation. Likewise, the requirement is relaxed if the

evidence merely reveals the defendant's
notice of the possibility that its
149
product is dangerous or defective.
Ultimately, the question of substantial similarity is a matter for the
sound discretion of the trial court, reversible only for abuse of
discretion.' 50 As with other forms of evidence, a court should exclude
other-accident evidence, even if relevant, "if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."

151

In

Motor Co., 750 A.2d 981, 988 (Vt. 2000) (finding that breakage of steering gear sector
shaft on Bronco caused loss of steering control; Ford's engineering investigations into
complaints of accidents alleging loss of steering control relevant under business-record
exception of hearsay rule).
148See, e.g., Nissan Motor Co. v. Armstrong, 32 S.W.3d 701, 711-12 (Tex. Ct. App.
2000), rev'd, 145 S.W.3d 131 (Tex. 2004); Santos, 715 N.E.2d at 53.
149 See, e.g., Smith, 214 F.3d at 1248-49; Weir v. Crown Equip. Corp.,
217 F.3d
453, 457-58 (7th Cir. 2000). See generallyMCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 124, §
200, at 707-08 (arguing that the similarity between the accidents need not be great when
used to prove notice); 2 WEINSTEIN's FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 124, § 401.08[2], at
401-52 (requiring less similarity for notice, while a very high degree of similarity is necessary to
proveproduct was unreasonably dangerous).
10 See, e.g., Lovett, 201 F.3d at 1080 (finding no abuse of discretion in exclusion of
other-accident evidence); Cooper Tire, 543 S.E.2d at 25 (holding that trial court did not
abuse discretion in excluding adjustment data regarding tire failure without a showing of
substantial similarity because "[a]bsent clear abuse, the trial court's exercise of discretion
is entitled to deference."); Palmer, 2003 WL 22006296, at *28 (finding that trial court
was within its discretion); see also Andrews v. Harley Davidson, Inc., 796 P.2d 1092,
1096 (Nev. 1990) (seeming less deferential in finding it was error not to allow evidence
of other accident, where difference was trivial between motorcycle hitting parked vs. moving
vehicle).
151 FED. R. EVID. 403; see, e.g., Weir, 217 F.3d at 458 (involving other brake failures
on same type of forklift); Drabik v. Stanley-Bostitch, Inc., 997 F.2d 496, 510-11 (8th
Cir. 1993) (overtuning $7.5 million punitive damages award); Brooks v. Chrysler Corp.,
786 F.2d 1191, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (affirming trial court's exclusion of evidence of
consumer complaints because of minimal probative value and substantial delay, but
remarking that "Chrysler would have attempted to rebut the substance of each of the 330
complaints or to distinguish the nature of the complaints contained therein from the
alleged defect in this case."); Blevins v. New Holland N. Am., Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d 952,
961 (W.D. Va. 2001) (excluding prior accident on hay baler under Rule 403 because "to
explore the similarities and dissimilarities of the Hornsby case with the present accident
will prolong the trial and risk jury confusion and prejudice"); Gen. Motors Corp. v.
Moseley, 447 S.E.2d 302, 307 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (overturning punitive damages verdict
of $101 million).

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 93

balancing the probative value of this form of evidence, a court may allow
evidence152of only those other accidents deemed most similar and exclude
the rest.

C. Absence of OtherAccidents
Because plaintiffs are normally permitted to use similar-accident

evidence to prove dangerousness, notice, and causation, it is only logical
and fair to allow defendants to use the absence of such evidence to prove
their case. 5 3 Generally, defendants may introduce the absence of similar
accidents to help establish that a product was not dangerous or defective,
that the defendant had no notice of danger or defect, or that causation
was absent.' 54 This reverse type of other-accident evidence, called "safeuse" evidence, also requires a proper foundation of substantial similarity:
a defendant must demonstrate the safe use' 55 of the same type of product
under conditions substantially similar to those of the plaintiffs
accident. '56

It may be that evidence of the absence of prior accidents is less
probative than evidence of the existence of prior accidents since proof of
the absence of accidents really shows only that none have been
discovered, not that they did not occur.' Thus, it has been asserted "that
proving a negative by the lack of accidents is 'more complex' than

152See, e.g., Carballo-Rodriguez v. Clark Equip. Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 66, 74
(D.P.R. 2001); Weir, 217 F.3d at 459; Jones v. Ford Motor Co., 559 S.E.2d 592, 603 (Va.
2002).
153 See, e.g., Schaffner v. Chicago & N. W. Transp. Co., 515 N.E.2d 298, 309 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1987), a~f'd, 541 N.E.2d 643 (I11. 1989); Schaefer v. Cedar Fair, L.P., 791 A,2d
1056, 1057 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
i54 See, e.g., Varano v. Jabar, 197 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1999) (causation); Benson v.
Honda Motor Co., 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 322, 325 (Ct. App. 1994); Spino v. John S. Tilley
Ladder Co., 696 A.2d 1169, 1173 (Pa. 1997) (same), noted in Lance A. Whiteman, Note,
Spino v. John S. Tilley Ladder Co.: The Pennsylvania Supreme CourtPermits Defendant
to Admit Absence of PriorAccidents in ProductsLiability Action, 60 U. PITt. L. REV. 297
(1998). See generally McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 124, § 200; Morris, supra
note 124, at 205; Kenneth A. Ross, A Good Accident Reporting System Can Help in
Defending Product Liability Cases, 7 PROD. LIAR. L. & STRATEGY 1 (2000) (stating that
admissibility may be dependent on existence of effective accident reporting system);
Malia, supranote 124, at 1186 (discussing admissibility of absence ofotherproduct accidents).
55 The reliability of this kind of evidence requires similar use by a large number of
other persons. See, e.g., Watkins v. Toro Co., 901 S.W.2d 917, 920 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
6 See, e.g., Pandit v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 82 F.3d 376, 380 (10th Cir. 1996);
Espeaignnette v. Gene Tiemey Co., 43 F.3d 1, 9-10 (1st Cir, 1994).
15 See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 124, § 200, at 709; LILLY ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 124, § 5.17, at 189.
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proving the happening of an accident."'' 58 Notwithstanding, while case
law on the admissibility of the absence of accidents is less voluminous, a
number of cases have allowed evidence of a product's good safety
history to help refute a plaintiff's other-accident evidence15 9 and
consequently disprove dangerousness, 160 causation,' 6 1 or notice. 162 But

evidence of the absence of other accidents normally is relevant only in
cases involving design and warnings defects, not in manufacturing defect
63
cases.

1

D. Subsequent Accidents

Most other-accident evidence admitted in products liability litigation
involves accidents that occurred before the plaintiffs accident.
While some courts disagree, 164 a number of courts allow evidence of
other accidents that occurred after the defendant's product was sold or

involved in the plaintiff's accident. 165 These courts reason that the
probative force of such evidence for demonstrating causation or a
product's dangerous (or defective) condition in no way depends on when
the other accidents occurred. It is clear, however, that evidence of

151 Schaefer, 791 A.2d at 1064 (discussing the distinction between other-accident
and no-accident evidence).

159 See, e.g., id.
160 See, e.g., Espeaignnette, 43 F.3d at 10 (1st Cir. 1994); Emerson Elec. Co. v.

Garcia, 623 So. 2d 523, 524 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
161See Varano v. Jabar, 197 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1999); Spino v. John S. Tilley
Ladder Co., 696 A.2d 1169, 1173 (Pa. 1997).
162 See Jimenez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 885 P.2d 120, 122-23 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1994), vacated in part on other grounds, 904 P.2d 861 (Ariz. 1994) (discussing whether
defendant's detailed offer of proof of company's thorough accident information gathering
system satisfied rigorous admissibility test).
163See, e.g., Jones v. Pak-Mor Mfg. Co., 700 P.2d 819, 827 n.4 (Ariz. 1985)
(finding safety history of entire line of products irrelevant to whether product was
mismanufactured); McKenzie v. S K Hand Tool Corp., 650 N.E.2d 612, 619-20 (I11.
App. Ct. 1995) (finding that trial court erred in admitting evidence of absence of other
accidents).
164 See, e.g., Mercer v. Pittway Corp., 616 N.W.2d 602, 615 (Iowa 2000) ("[Tlhe
rule allowing evidence of similar incidents is generally limited to incidents occurring
prior to the one in question.").
165 See, e.g., Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 214 F.3d 1235, 1248 (10th Cir. 2000)
(N.M. law) (defectiveness); Carballo-Rodriguez v. Clark Equip. Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 66,
73 (D.P.R. 2001) (latching defect in crane; notice and negligent design); Simon v.
Coppola, 876 P.2d 10, 14 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993); Preston v. Mont. Eighteenth Jud. Dist.
Ct., 936 P.2d 814, 820 (Mont. 1997); Robinson v. G.G.C., Inc., 808 P.2d 522, 525 (Nev.
1991); Slyke v. Sunterra Corp., No. 183382, 2001 WL 543419, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar.
21, 2001) (allowing incidents with showerhead for purposes of proving causation).
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166
subsequent accidents can have no relevance to the issue of notice, and
the relevance of such evidence rests upon the substantial similarity
between subsequent accidents and the plaintiffs accident. 67 At least one
to show a
jurisdiction allows evidence of subsequent similar accidents
168
defendant's culpability for purposes of punitive damages.

III.

SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES

The longer a product is on the market, the more a manufacturer
learns about the product's hazards and how best to eliminate them. Over
time, a manufacturer with due concern for product safety will tend to
improve its manufacturing processes, enhance the design safety of its products,
and provide consumers with better information on product dangers and
how to avoid them. This natural evolution of product safety gives rise to
an important issue as to the admissibility of evidence that a
manufacturer, after making and selling the product that injured the
plaintiff, improved the product's safety in a manner that would have
prevented the injury.
The fact that a manufacturer has eliminated the very danger
responsible for a plaintiff's injury is powerful evidence that the particular
safety enhancement was both practicable and otherwise reasonable at the
time the safety change was made. So, by improving a product's design
safety or by providing additional warnings or instructions, a
manufacturer acknowledges the fact that, at that time, the benefits of the
safety improvement exceeded the costs. Absent a technological
breakthrough between the time the product causing the plaintiffs injury
was manufactured (or when the plaintiff is injured) and the time the
product's safety is improved, evidence of such a safety enhancement
may well suggest that, prior to its improvement, the product was
defective. This in turn may show that the manufacturer was negligent.
Therefore, evidence that a manufacturer adopted a subsequent remedial
to liability and presumptively
measure would normally be relevant
169
admissible in a products liability case.
166 See, e.g., Smith, 214 F.3d at 1248.
167Compare Crowston v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 521 N.W.2d 401, 411-12

(N.D. 1994) (upholding exclusion of subsequent accident evidence not substantially
similar to plaintiff's accident), with Gowler v. Ferrell-Ross Co., 563 N.E.2d 773, 777-78
(I11.App. Ct. 1990) (allowing such evidence where subsequent accidents were similar,
though not identical).
168See Smith, 214 F.3d at 1249 (N.M. law). But see Burke v. Deere & Co., 6 F.3d
497, 507-09 (8th Cir. 1993) (Iowa law), amended by 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 21878.
169See FED. R. EVID. 402 ("All relevant evidence is admissible....").
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Development of the Repair Doctrine

Evidence that an actor cured a dangerous condition after it injured a
plaintiff may be relevant to both the condition's defectiveness and the
actor's negligence, but it establishes neither. The use of such evidence
may unjustly punish persons for their care and prudence and diminish
safety by providing parties in control of dangerous conditions a
disincentive to reduce or cure existing hazards. "° For these reasons, at an
early date courts developed a special rule of relevancy called the "repair
doctrine," 171 which bars evidence of a defendant's post-accident repairs
used to prove the defendant's negligence. The doctrine spread from
Britain 17 2 to America 173 and was announced by the United States
Supreme Court in an 1892 case in which the Court explained:
[I]t is now settled . . . [that post-accident repair] evidence is
incompetent for the purpose of proving negligence, because the taking
of such precautions against the future is not to be construed as an
admission of responsibility for the past, has no legitimate tendency to
prove that the defendant had been negligent before the accident
from the
happened, and is calculated to distract the minds of the jury
74
real issue, and to create a prejudice against the defendant.1
Today, the rule barring evidence of subsequent remedial measures to
prove negligence is the law in almost every state 175 by common law or

"0A post-accident repair
afford[s] no legitimate basis for construing such an act as an admission of
previous neglect of duty. A person may have exercised all the care which the
law required, and yet in the light of his new experience, after an unexpected
accident has occurred, and as a measure of extreme caution, he may adopt
additional safeguards. The more careful a person is, the more regard he has for
the lives of others, the more likely he would be to do so, and it would seem
unjust that he could not do so without being liable to have such acts construed
as an admission of prior negligence. We think such a rule puts an unfair
interpretation upon human conduct, and virtually holds out an inducement for
continued negligence.
Morse v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 16 N.W. 358, 359 (Minn. 1883).
171
It is also known as the "subsequent repair," "subsequent remedial measure," and
"post-accident corrective measure" rule or doctrine.

172In Hart v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry., 21 L.T.R. 261, 263 (Ex. 1869), Lord

Bramwell of the Court of Exchequer explained that it would be "barbarous... to hold,
that because the world gets wiser as it gets older, therefore it was foolish before."
173
See, e.g., Terre Haute & Indianapolis R.R. v. Clem, 23 N.E. 965, 966 (Ind. 1890).
174 Columbia & Puget Sound R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 207 (1892).
175Rhode Island appears to be the only state that liberally allows the admission of
evidence of subsequent remedial measures. See R.I. R. EVID.R. 407.
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formal rule of evidence. 176 The doctrine applies to products liability
litigation by barring evidence of subsequent safety improvements to
prove negligence and, in some jurisdictions, product defectiveness.
It is a controversial rule because of the myriad exceptions that

swallow the general rule of exclusion, 7 7 as well as for the logic of its
premises, the ambiguity of its formulation, and its economic and other
policy implications. 7 8 The repair doctrine applies to products liability
litigation, barring evidence of subsequent safety improvements
79 to prove
negligence and, in some jurisdictions, product defectiveness. 1

176See, e.g., Ray v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 685 A.2d 411, 420-21 (D.C. Cir. 1996),
amended by 696 A.2d 399 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (refusing to admit evidence that,
after plaintiff
contracted HIV, Red Cross began to screen donors by directly questioning them);
Fernandez v. Higdon Elevator Co., 632 N.Y.S.2d 546 (App. Div. 1995) ("[Such
evidence] is never admissible as proof of admission of negligence.") (citations omitted).
See generally, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 124, § 267; DAVID P. LEONARD,
THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE, SELECTED RULES OF LIMITED
ADMISSIBILITY ch. 2 (2002); LILLY ON EVIDENCE, supra note 124, § 5.18; WEINSTEIN'S
FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 124, ch. 407; 2 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 124,
§ 283; 23 FED. PRAC. & PROC., supra note 124, § 5282; Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation,
Admissibility of Evidence of Repairs, Change of Conditions, or PrecautionsTaken After
Accident-Modern State Cases, 15 A.L.R. 5TH 119 (1993); Marjorie A. Shields,
Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures Under Rule 407
of FederalRules of Evidence, 158 A.L.R. FED. 609 (1999) (Fed. R. Evid. 407).
177See, e.g., 1 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, MODERN STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE: A
COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE TEXT 480 (1989) ("[T]he opportunities for admissibility
may fairly be said to come close to swallowing up the rule [of exclusion].").
178See generally J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE MANUAL,
§ 7.0411] (same) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE MANUAL]; 23 FED. PRAC. & PROC.
EVID., supra note 124, § 5282 (2002) (challenging the justifications of Fed. R. Evid.
407); C. Paul Carver, Subsequent Remedial Measures 2000 and Beyond, 27 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 583, 587 (2000) (criticizing the rule on all these grounds and
characterizing the current rule as "a post hoc litigation artifice for clever lawyers to use to
their client's advantage").
179
See generally AM. LAW. PROD. LIAB. 3D, supra note 26, §§ 14:53 et seq. &
§§ 54:9-11; Carver, supra note 178 (citing the large body of literature at n.5); 3 FRUMER
& FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 26, § 18.06; 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON
PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 26, § 27:5; Thomas S. Stewart & Stacy H. Andreas,
Subsequent Remedial Measures: An Analytical Model for Product Liability Cases, 26
TORT & INS. L.J. 74 (1990); Randolph L. Bums, Note, Subsequent Remedial Measures
and Strict ProductsLiability: A New-Relevant--Answer to an Old Problem, 81 VA. L.
REV. 1141 (1995); Lev Dassin, Design Defects in the Rules Enabling Act: the
Misapplication of FederalRule ofEvidence 407 to Strict Liability, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 736
(1990); Note, ProductsLiability & Evidence ofSubsequent Repairs, 1972 DUKE L.J. 837;
David Wadsworth, Casenote, Forma Scientific v. Biosera, 960 P.2d 108 (Colo. 1998), 71
U. COLO. L. REv. 757; John E. Theuman, Annotation, Products Liability: Admissibility of
Evidence of Postinjury Warning Measures Undertaken by Defendant, 38 A.L.R. 4TH 583
(1985) (admissibility of post-injury warnings); John S. Herbrand, Annotation, Products
Liability: Admissibility, Against Manufacturer, of Product Recall Letter, 84 A.L.R. 3D
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B. FederalRule ofEvidence 407
The general rule prohibiting evidence of post-accident repairs to
prove negligence was adopted in Federal Rule of Evidence 407,
"Subsequent Remedial Measures," which originally provided:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously,
would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the
subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable
conduct in connection with the event. This rule does not require the
exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another
purpose, such as proving ownership, control,
feasibility of
• . or .180
precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
In this original iteration, Rule 407 generated interpretative problems
concerning: (1) whether the rule barred evidence of subsequent remedial
measures in strict liability cases, or was limited to negligence claims;' 8'
and (2) whether, regardless of the theory of recovery, the rule applied to
safety measures a manufacturer adopted after the date of manufacture
and sale but before the plaintiff was injured, or applied only to measures
adopted after the plaintiff's injury. To resolve these questions, the first
sentence of Rule 407 was amended in 1997 to read:
When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event, measures
are taken that, if taken previously, would have made the injury or harm
less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not
admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a product,
2
a defect in a product's design, or a need for a warning or instruction. 1

1220 (1978) (recall letters); Bruce I. McDaniel, Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence of
Subsequent Repairs or Other Remedial Measures in Products Liability Cases, 74 A.L.R.
3D 1001 (1978) (admissibility in products liability cases generally).
180FED. R. Evil. 407 (original 1975 version).
181 The interpretive question was whether "culpable conduct" included strict
products liability.
182 FED. R. EVID. 407. Thais L. Richardson, Comment, The ProposedAmendment to
FederalRule of Evidence 407: A Subsequent Remedial Measure that Does Not Fix the
Problem, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1453 (1996) (criticizing proposed amendment). Apart from
the treatises cited previously, the amendment is also examined in Eric L. Vinson, Note,
Applying FederalRule ofEvidence 407 in Strict Liability: A Discussion of Changes to the
Rule, 16 REv. LITIG. 773 (1997) (supporting amended Fed. R. Evid. 407).
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In federal court, the revised rule makes it clear' 83 (1)that it applies

and bars evidence of safety improvements in strict products liability
cases, as well as negligence, and that it applies to all three types of
defect;' 8 4 and (2) it excludes only evidence of safety improvements
adopted after the plaintiffs injury, leaving the admissibility of safety

improvements made after manufacture but before the plaintiff's injury to
the general rules of relevancy and prejudice. 8 5 While a large number of
other issues remain unresolved, 86 the revisions to Federal Rule of
Evidence 407 clarify considerably how the repair doctrine applies to
products liability cases under federal law.
C. Strict Liability Claims Under State Law

While a few states already have adopted the clarifications of the new
federal rule, 187 the evidence codes and common law of most states still
track the repair doctrine's traditional formulation in terms of negligence
and culpability. 88 The states agree that the repair doctrine applies to
183Most federal courts hold that the federal rule, rather than state law, applies in
diversity cases. The Tenth Circuit is an exception. See, e.g., Call v. State Indus., No. 998046, 2000 WL 1015076, at *5 (10th Cir. July 24, 2000) (Wyo. law); Garcia v.
Fleetwood Enters., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1303 (D.N.M. 2002) (N.M. law). See generally
3 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 26, § 18.06[31[g]; Wadsworth,
supra note 179, at 779-86 (excellent discussion); Andrea Lynn Flink, Note, Admissibility
of Subsequent Remedial Measures Evidence in Diversity Actions Based on Strict
Products Liability, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1485 (1985).
184 See, e.g., Stahl v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 271 n.10 (5th Cir. 2002)
(warning added to package insert after plaintiffs injury is not admissible to show that
earlier warning was defective); J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 243 F.3d
441, 445 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that GM's subsequent safety improvements in seat
integrity are inadmissible to prove that earlier design was defective).
185See, e.g., Carballo-Rodriguez v. Clark Equip. Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 66, 77
(D.P.R. 2001) (admitting evidence of pre-accident service bulletin and warning decal on
crane); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Baker Material Handling Corp., 62 F.3d 24, 27
(1st Cir. 1995) (refusing to apply Rule 407 to evidence of pre-accident design change).
See generally Rule 407 advisory committee's note to 1997 Amendment: "Evidence of
subsequent measures that is not barred by Rule 407 may still be subject to exclusion on
Rule 403 grounds when the dangers of prejudice or confusion substantially outweigh the
probative value of the evidence."
186 On Fed. R. Evid. 407, see Shields, supra note 176.
187 See FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 90.407 (West 2004) (omitting "defect in product's design,
or a need for a warning or instruction"); IDAHo R. EVID. 407; ME. R. EVID. 407; N.D. R.
EVID. 407.
188 Although many states have some version of the federal rules of evidence, most
have not formally amended their rules to conform to the 1997 change to Rule 407, which
explicitly applies to strict products liability claims. See, e.g., PA. R. EVID. 407, construed
in Duchess v. Langston Corp., 769 A.2d 1131, 1137-50 (Pa. 2001) (traditional rule
providing that evidence of subsequent remedial measures is not admissible to prove
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products liability claims based on negligence, but they split on whether
the rule should be expanded to shield manufacturers against evidence of
subsequent remedial measures in products liability claims. Many states,
by formal rule of evidence' 8 9 or judicial opinion, 190 limit the exclusionary
rule to negligence claims and so allow a plaintiff to introduce evidence of
subsequent remedial measures in strict liability cases. The classic case
adopting this view is Ault v. InternationalHarvester Co., which rejected
the empirical assumptions underlying the rule in the modem products
liability context:
The contemporary corporate mass producer of goods, the normal
products liability defendant, manufactures tens of thousands of units of
goods; it is manifestly unrealistic to suggest that such a producer will
forego making improvements in its product, and risk innumerable
additional lawsuits and the attendant adverse effect upon its public
image, simply because evidence of adoption of such improvement may
liability for recovery on an
be admitted in an action founded on strict
9
injury that preceded the improvement.' 1
Ruling to the contrary, many other states have opted to broaden the
rule beyond its traditional negligence basis by also excluding evidence of
subsequent remedial measures in the strict liability context."' These
culpable conduct or negligence also applies in strict products liability cases); Hyjek v.
Anthony Indus., 944 P.2d 1036, 1040 (Wash. 1997) (same).
' See, e.g., ALASKA R. EviD. 407; HAw. REv. ST. ANN. § 626-1 (2004); HAW R.
EVID. 407; IOWA CODE ANN. R. 5.407; Ky. R. EviD. 407; TEX. R. EvID. 407(a), applied in
Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 341 (Tex. 1998).
190 See, e.g., Call v. State Indus., No. 99-8046, 2000 WL 1015076, at *5 (10th Cir.,
July 24, 2000) (Wyo. law); Ault v. Int'l Harvester Co. 528 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Cal. 1974);
Forma Scientific, Inc. v. Biosera, Inc., 960 P.2d 108, 114 (Colo. 1998); Wagner v. Clark
Equip. Co., 700 A.2d 38, 51-52 (Conn. 1997); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Mosley, 447 S.E.2d
302, 310 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994), overruled on other grounds, Webster v. Boyett, 496 S.E.2d
459, 463 (Ga. 1998); Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 281 N.E.2d 749, 753 (I1.
App. Ct. 1972); Ford Motor Co. v. Fulkerson, 812 S.W.2d 119, 126-27 (Ky. 1991); Barnett v. La
Soci&6t Anonyme Turbomeca France, 963 S.W.2d 639, 651-52 (Mo. App. 1997);
Robinson v. G.G.C., Inc., 808 P.2d 522, 526 (Nev. 1991); McFarland v. Bruno Mach.
Corp., 626 N.E.2d 659, 664 (Ohio 1994); Klug v. Keller Indus., 328 N.W.2d 847, 851-52
(S.D. 1982) overruled in part by First Premier Bank v. Kolcraft Enters., 686 N.W.2d 430
(S.D. 2004); Friederichs v. Huebner, 329 N.W.2d 890, 907-08 (Wis. 1983); Green v.
Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 617 N.W.2d 881, 892-93 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000), affd, 629
N.W.2d 727 (Wis. 2001); Caldwell v. Yamaha Motor Co., 648 P.2d 519, 525 (Wyo.

1982).
'9' Ault, 528 P.2d at 1152.

192See, e.g., Garcia v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1305 (D.N.M.
2002) (N.M. law); Hallmark v. Allied Prods. Corp., 646 P.2d 319, 325-26 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1982); Lawhon v. Ayres Corp., 992 S.W.2d 162, 166 (Ark. Ct. App. 1999); Smith v.
Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc., 650 N.E.2d 1108, 1113 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (noting
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courts reason that the policies that support excluding such evidence in

negligence cases-the questionable relevance of safety measures taken
subsequent to a product's manufacture, the undesirability of discouraging
safety improvements, and the risk of juror confusion-are equally
applicable to strict products liability cases. 193 Oddly, New York straddles
the issue by excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures in
strict liability cases regarding design and warning defects (unless
feasibility is contested), 194 while allowing such evidence in the less

typical context of manufacturing defects.'

95

D. Feasibility,Impeachment, and Other Limitations

The repair doctrine is subject to various exceptions. The postaccident repair rule bars the use of such evidence only for the purpose of
proving the defendant's negligence, culpability, or, in many jurisdictions,
the product's defectiveness. By its terms, the doctrine does not affect the

admissibility of post-accident repair evidence "when offered for another
purpose."' 96 In particular, the rule does not require the exclusion of
evidence of subsequent remedial measures to prove "the feasibility of
precautionary measures, if controverted,"'

97

or to impeach a witness.' 98

These exceptions often overlap.199

"potential chilling effect on safety improvements"); Moldovan v. Allis Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 268 N.W.2d 656, 660 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978); Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d
92, 98 (Minn. 1987); Rix v. Gen. Motors Corp., 723 P.2d 195, 202 (Mont. 1986); Cyr v.
J.I. Case Co., 652 A.2d 685, 694-95 (N.H. 1994); Krause v. Am. Aerolights, Inc., 762
P.2d 1011, 1013 (Or. 1988); Duchess, 769 A.2d at 1132-50 (5-2 decision) (allowing
such evidence only under both feasibility and impeachment exceptions); Hyjek v.
Anthony Indus., 944 P.2d 1036, 1040 (Wash. 1997); see also TENN. R. EvID. 407.
193 See, e.g., Duchess, 769 A.2d at 1138-50 (5-2 decision) (examining applicability
of traditional rationales to strict products liability).
194 See Demirovski v. Skil Corp., 610 N.Y.S.2d 551 (App. Div. 1994).
195See id.; Cover v. Cohen, 461 N.E.2d 864, 868 (N.Y. 1984).
'96 FED. R.EVID. 407.
197Id. Note that the question of thefeasibility of a safety improvement may give rise
to another evidentiary issue: the admissibility of state-of-the-art evidence. In cases
where technology has advanced between when the product was manufactured and when
the manufacturer adopted a safety improvement, the state-of-the-art doctrine is likely to
bar evidence of the safety enhancement if the enhancement was practicably unavailable at
the time of manufacture. See, e.g., Patton v. Hutchison Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d
1299, 1312-13 (Kan. 1993) (interpreting KAN. STAT. ANN. 60-3307(a)(1) (1992)). See
generally OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 2, § 10.4.
19 See, e.g., Traylor v. Husqvarna Motor, 988 F.2d 729, 733-34 (7th Cir. 1993);
Wilson Foods Corp. v. Turner, 460 S.E.2d 532, 535 (Ga. 1995).
199 The overlap is most pronounced when a manufacturer denies the feasibility of a
safety measure it adopted shortly after the plaintiffs accident.
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The significance of the "feasibility" and "impeachment" exceptions
depends largely on how narrowly or widely they are interpreted and
applied. The integrity of this rule depends upon the exceptions not
swallowing the general rule of exclusion. A manufacturer, of course,
must be deemed to have controverted feasibility if it denies the
technological possibility of a safety measure it subsequently adopts, even
if it does so only implicitly, as by asserting that the product was already
the safest possible. 00 So, too, a manufacturer obviously controverts the
feasibility of a safety measure if it explicitly denies that fact.2 ' By the
same token, if a manufacturer explicitly admits the feasibility of
precautionary measures, proof that it subsequently adopted them
normally should be excluded.20 2
The more difficult question is whether a manufacturer controverts
the feasibility of safety measures (or may have its witnesses impeached)
by defending the safety, reasonableness, or acceptability of its earlier design or
warning. While a defendant's arguments along these lines might result in
admissibility under one or both exceptions, most courts have narrowly
construed these exceptions to prevent their swallowing the general rule
of exclusion. 0 3 The repair doctrine rests on the premise that a defendant
normally should be allowed to assert that both its product and its actions
were safe and reasonable at the time of manufacture without having to
deal with proof that it later decided to improve the product. This suggests
that the exceptions should not be interpreted so broadly as to allow a
plaintiff to use a back door exception to introduce evidence of a type and
for a purpose that the general rule bars at the front. So, if a manufacturer

200See 3 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 26, § 18.06[1][f].
201See, e.g., Reese v. Mercury Marine Div., 793 F.2d 1416, 1428 (5th Cir. 1986)

(defendant denied feasibility of warnings subsequently added to instruction manual);
Dixon v. Int'l Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 584 (5th Cir. 1985) (defendant's witness
asserted that plaintiff's proposed design was not feasible because it would block tractor

operator's view).

202See, e.g., J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 243 F.3d 441, 445 n.3
(8th Cir. 2001) (defendant stipulated feasibility of stiffer seats by admitting that it had
"tested proposed seating systems that were both stronger and not as strong as the seating

system in the 1991 Camaro"); Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 98 (Minn.
1987) (defendant conceded feasibility of altering transmission design).
But a manufacturer may be too clever in first admitting "feasibility" and then
attempting to limit its definition to technological possibility. See Duchess v. Langston
Corp., 769 A.2d 1131, 1145-50 (Pa. 2001) (rejecting defendant's effort to avoid evidence

of subsequent safety measures by admitting its feasibility, but only in terms of
technological possibility, and arguing that its use would preclude the product from
functioning properly).
203 See Duchess, 769 A.2d at 1145-50; 3 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY, supra note 26, § 18.0611]"[f].
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concedes the economic and technological feasibility of a particular safety
enhancement that it eventually adopted, it still may argue that "the safety
problem was not great enough to warrant the trade-off of consumer
frustration, increased complexity of the product, and risk of consumer
efforts to disconnect the safety device" without opening the door to proof
that it adopted the enhancement under the feasibility or impeachment
exceptions. 2 4 Thus, the feasibility and impeachment exceptions normally
should be applied, and evidence of a subsequent corrective measure
admitted, only if a manufacturer asserts that the measure was
impracticable at the time of manufacture. °5
A variety of other issues lurking within the repair doctrine may
restrict or expand its use, and the resolution of such issues in state court
may rest upon the particular state's formulation of the repair doctrine.
While a great majority of the subsequent repair cases involve design or
warning defects, the doctrine may also apply to defects in a product's
manufacture. 0 6 One important issue that continues to divide the states is
whether the exclusionary rule should be limited to remedial measures
adopted after the plaintiffs accident,20 7 as under the revised federal rule,
or whether it should be applied more broadly to exclude evidence of any

safety improvements made after the date a product is manufactured or
sold. 20 8 Another question is whether the repair doctrine applies to safety

measures taken by a third party, such as an employer who adds a safety

204 See Gauthier v. AIVIF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634, 638 (9th Cir. 1986) (admitting

evidence of subsequent remedial measures was improper in view of manufacturer's
concession of feasibility).
205 Compare Duchess, 769 A.2d at 1145 50 (applying both exceptions and holding
that trial court erred in excluding evidence of subsequently adopted interlock safety
device where defendant challenged practicability of that device), with Keating v. United
Instruments, Inc., 742 A.2d 128, 130-31 (N.H. 1999) (finding that trial court properly
excluded evidence of subsequent safety measure in aircraft altimeter because measure did
not "directly" impeach defendant's expert).
206 But see, e.g., Rix v. Gen. Motors Corp., 723 P.2d 195, 202 (Mont. 1986)
(disallowing such evidence in manufacturing defect claim); see also FED. R. EVID. 407
(barring admission of subsequent remedial measures to prove, inter alia, "a defect in a
product, a defect in a product's design, or a need for a warning or instruction" (emphasis
added)). For an early example of a court disallowing subsequent measures in a
manufacturing defect case, see Foley v. Coca-ColaBottling Co., 215 S.W.2d 314, 31618 (Mo. Ct. App. 1948) (tacks in soft drink).
207 See, e.g., Myers v. Hearth Techs., Inc., 621 N.W.2d 787, 792 (Minn. Ct. App.
2001) (rule did not apply to, and so did not bar admission of, safety enhancement made
before accident); Tucker v. Caterpillar, Inc., 564 N.W.2d 410, 413 (Iowa 1997) (same).
208 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-686(2) (West 2004) (applying rule to corrective
measures adopted after sale); Brown v. Ford Motor Co., 714 N.E.2d 556, 559 (111.App.
Ct. 1999) (applying same policy considerations after sale or manufacture); Cover v.
Cohen, 461 N.E.2d 864, 868 (N.Y. 1984) (after manufacture).
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feature to a product after an employee is injured. While most courts hold
that the doctrine is limited to manufacturers and does not bar evidence of
safety improvements by third parties, at least two courts have extended
the exclusionary rule beyond manufacturers to remedial measures
adopted by third parties. 20 9 Another issue on which the courts are split is

whether the rule applies to remedial measures required by the
government, such as mandatory safety improvements ordered by
NHTSA or another federal agency in charge of safety regulation. Here,
the safety-disincentive rationale disappears.210
IV. CONCLUSION

In litigating a products liability case, the plaintiff's most fundamental

task is to prove that the product was defective; typically, there is no case
without a product defect. Proof that a product violated some safety

standard promulgated by the industry or the government is often
compelling proof that the product's dangers were excessive, that the
product was defective, and possibly that the manufacturer was negligent

in selling it in that condition. So, too, a manufacturer or other defendant
may rely on its compliance with such a standard as evidence of the
absence of a defect, although such evidence often is less probative when
used to prove a negative. Evidence that a product failed previously in a

similar manner logically points to an inference of product defect, just as
209Compare Ford Motor Co. v. Nuckolls, 894 S.W.2d 897, 900-01 (Ark. 1995)
(evidence that employer improved product's safety after accident was properly admitted),
and Wagner v. Clark Equip. Co., 700 A.2d 38, 51-52 (Conn. 1997) (same), with Padillas
v. Stork-Gamco, Inc., No. 95-7090, 2000 WL 1470210 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2000) (same),
and Torrens v. Delta Int'l Mach. Corp., 696 N.Y.S.2d 230, 231 (App. Div. 1999)
(evidence that employer, subsequent to accident, fashioned safety guard that would have
prevented injury was properly excluded). See generally James L. Johnson, Subsequent
Remedial Measures May Not Be Admissible to Establish Product Design Defect, 3 No. 7
LAW. J. 6 (summarizing Padillas); Karen K. Peabody, Annotation, Products Liability:
Admissibility of Evidence of Subsequent Repairs or other Remedial Measures by Third
Party Other than Defendant, 64 A.L.R. 5TH 119 (1998).
210See generally E. Lee Reichert, Note, The "Superior Authority Exception" to
FederalRule of Evidence 407: the "Remedial Measure" Required to Clarify a Confused
State of Evidence, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 843 (1991); Shields, supra note 177, § 5 (citing
cases that address a "superior authority" exception to Rule 407).
Evidence of product recalls, which are sometimes voluntary and at other times
ordered by a regulatory agency, raise various evidentiary issues including the subsequent
repair doctrine. See generally WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE MANUAL, supra note 178,
§ 7.04[3]; AM. LAW PROD. LIAB. 3d, supra note 26, §§ 14:64-14:66; Herbrand, supra
note 179 (admissibility of recall letter by defendant-manufacturer). On product recalls,
see OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 2, § 10.7.
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a product's long history of safe use suggests the opposite: that the
product in fact contains no design or warnings defects. Finally, a
manufacturer's subsequent removal of a product hazard tends to suggest
its recognition that the hazard was a problem and that its remedy was
feasible, which often goes far to prove defectiveness and negligence. But
the law has properly struggled with whether to allow such evidence of
subsequent remedial measures when such a rule of evidence might deter
manufacturers from repairing product hazards. These are among the
more prominent issues of proof of defectiveness that recur in modem
products liability litigation.

